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INTRODUCTION 
In his Opening Brief (the "Appellant's Brief), Appellant Alan Willey asked this 
court to overturn a decision of the trial court regarding the ineffectiveness of the 
assistance he received from his trial counsel. Willey set forth numerous ways in which 
the assistance rendered by defense counsel fell below the minimum level of effectiveness, 
including in particular the failure to investigate and develop fatal inconsistencies in the 
testimony of so-called "corroborative witnesses," including: a) investigating and 
identifying the inconsistencies themselves; b) investigating and identifying possible 
influences that might have tainted or confused decade-old memories of the corroborating 
witnesses and c) retaining and using an expert to both advise with respect to how best to 
conduct the investigation and then to advise the jury as to the accepted scientific studies 
showing how old memories can be influenced - indeed, even "created" - by these factors. 
In its Reply, the State goes to great length to detail the alleged "corroborative" 
evidence that supports the verdict. What the State does not do, however, is challenge the 
professional credentials of Willey's nationally renowned expert, nor does it challenge the 
rigor or the validity of the scientific studies upon which the expert's testimony was based. 
Appellant does not dispute that there was evidence that, on the surface, appeared to 
support the State's case. 
The issue for this appeal, however, is not whether the State proved its case based 
on what was in the record. The issue is whether there was sufficient corroborative 
evidence in the record, but rather whether defense counsel's blanket acceptance of the 
l 
reliability of the corroborative evidence was reasonable, and whether strategic decisions 
based on those assumptions were legitimate. As did defense counsel in this case, the 
State simply assumes the reliability of the witness testimony and therefore begs this 
question. 
For all of the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Brief, and for all the reasons set 
forth below, Alan Willey asks this Court to determine that he did not receive a fair trial 
because his counsel made no effort to investigate, attack or discredit the State's evidence. 
A. The State Attacks the Messenger (Dr. Barden), But It Does Not Refute 
the Rigor of the Scientific Studies Upon Which He Relied or their 
Applicability to the Issues in this Case. 
At the hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel, Dr. R. Christopher Barden 
testified that it was ineffective of defense counsel not to provide the jury with expert 
testimony on the science of memory, to explain how and why seemingly convincing 
testimony regarding old memories may in fact have been influenced by outside factors 
that render it less credible. Dr. Barden is an expert witness with a national reputation; as 
set forth in his resume, he is the recipient of several national science awards and he is a 
former member of the Minnesota State Board of Psychology and a former Assistant 
Attorney General for the State of Utah and a trainer to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. [Resume of Dr. R. Christopher Barden, Ex. 15, April 29, 2009 
Evidentiary Hearing]. 
Rather than deal with the substantive science and evidentiary issues raised by Dr. 
Barden in his testimony, the trial court instead attacks Dr. Barden's credibility, as does 
the State in its brief, going so far as claim that his opinion "arguably demonstrated 
intellectual dishonesty." This conclusion is contradicted by the scientific rigor of the 
studies - which the State makes no attempt at all to distinguish or refute - showing how 
time and intervening distorting events can affect the reliability of testimony regarding the 
very old childhood memories of the witnesses in this case. 
The refusal of the trial court to acknowledge the benefit of expert consultation and 
testimony in this case is in stark contrast to the recent decision of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah in State v. Clopten, 209 UT 84, 223 P.2d 1103 . In Clopten, the Utah 
Supreme Court acknowledges in definitive terms the necessity of expert testimony to 
educate the jury as to the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony, 
relying heavily on the work of national memory expert, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, the same 
memory expert whose work Dr. Barden drew heavily upon in formulating his expert 
opinion in this case.1 
As Dr. Barden explained in his expert opinion, old memories such as the ones at 
issue in this case are subject to the same sort of distorting factors that affect the reliability 
of eyewitness testimony. As discussed in greater detail below, and for many of the 
same reasons set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Clopten, expert testimony, 
1
 The unrefuted evidence in this case shows that Dr. Loftus herself consulted with 
Alan Willey's family and was willing to work with defense counsel in this case, but that 
defense counsel refused to call her. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, 266-7 [Packet R]. 
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especially by highly qualified experts of Dr. Loftus's or Dr. Barden's standing, is 
absolutely necessary to educate the jury as to the factors that affect the reliability of old 
memories of both the complaining witness himself as well as the corroborating 
eyewitnesses, and a fair trial cannot be had without it. 
In prior pleadings, including the Opening Brief, Appellant relied heavily on the 
decision of this Court in State v. Clopten, 2O08 Ut.App. 2005. In its Brief, the State 
completely ignores the evidentiary considerations recognized by both this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court in Clopten, as did defense counsel in formulating his trial strategy. 
Appellant requests that this Court apply the rationale of Clopten to the issues of memory 
distortion and corruption in this case, and determine that defense counsel's failure to 
appropriately consult with, and use at trial, a recognized expert in the field of memory 
science constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel entitling Appellant to a new trial. 
1. In State v. Clopten the Utah Supreme Court Acknowledges that a Fair 
Trial Requires Expert Testimony on the Science of Human Memory 
With Respect to the Fallibility of Eyewitness Testimony 
In State v. Clopten, the defendant wanted to present expert testimony to challenge 
the accuracy of eyewitness evidence. The trial court refused to admit the expert 
testimony, and the Court of Appeals declined to overturn the conviction because existing 
case law held that expert testimony was not required and that a cautionary jury instruction 
and/or cross-examination of the eyewitnesses was sufficient. 
The Court of Appeals, however, posited that the issues of human memory that 
affected the reliability of eyewitness evidence may require expert testimony to assure a 
4 
fair trial, and invited the Supreme Court to take up the issue. The Supreme Court of 
Utah accepted the invitation, and in a careful and scholarly opinion agreed with this 
Court that expert testimony should be required in cases where there was evidence of the 
distorting factors that have been scientifically determined to affect the reliability of 
eyewitness memory. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Clopten, the role of the expert is not to opine 
to opine as to the credibility of the specific testimony in the trial, because that would 
constitute an improper attempt by the expert to invade the province of the jury in 
determining witness credibility in the particular case. Accordingly, the trial court's 
conclusion, and the State's argument, that Dr. Barden's testimony should be discounted 
because he was not familiar with the particulars of the Utah statute on sexual abuse and 
was not an experienced trial attorney are simply wrong, because proper use of expert 
testimony in this context is not dependent upon the expert's knowledge of the specific 
facts or issues in the case. 
Rather, it is the expert's role to explicate for the jury the factors that might affect 
the reliability of the witness's memory, after which it is up to the jury to apply those 
factors to the testimony in a given case. The jury was not able to perform this essential 
exercise in this case, however, because defense counsel failed to provide them with either 
2
 See Clopten, |369 in which this notion is discredited, with the Supreme Court 
recognizing that it "might be important... for an expert to educate the factfinder about 
general principles without attempting to apply those principles to the specific facts of the 
case, (quoting from the advisory committee note to Utah R. Evid. 702). 
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percipient evidence of the existence of the factors or with expert testimony of how those 
factors might distort the memory of witnesses. 
The Supreme Court in Clopten recognized also that "there is little doubt that juries 
are generally unaware of these deficiencies in human perception and memory and thus 
give great weight to eyewitness identifications." Juries were particularly swayed by the 
confidence of an eyewitness, even though such confidence correlated only weakly with 
accuracy. In light of these concerns, the Court answered "yes" to the question of 
"whether expert testimony is generally necessary to adequately educate a jury regarding 
these inherent deficiencies." Id., f 16. This is precisely the same research on which Dr. 
Barden relied, and the same conclusion that he explicated in detail. 
The Supreme Court, relying heavily on a scientific study by Dr. Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, recognized the danger of relying on solely on either cross-examination or 
cautionary instructions when dealing with the certainty that is often exhibited by good-
faith witnesses who are not lying, but are testifying to what they believe is true. Id., Tfl6. 
The Court observed that: "Cross-examination will often expose a lie or half-truth, but 
may be far less effective when witnesses, although mistaken, believe that whal they say is 
true." Id, TJ21,fn. 12. 
Appellant submits that these same concerns are equally applicable in any case 
where the potential for memory distortion and corruption exists, because the same 
concern - the certainty of the good-faith, but mistaken, witness - skews the jury's 
determination of witness credibility. 
6 
Each and every one of the factors considered by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Clopten applies with equal force to the value and necessity of expert testimony in this 
case, where the concern is not that the good faith eyewitnesses are lying, but that the 
reliability of memories of events that occurred more than ten years previously is 
inherently unreliable. Cross-examination is not particularly helpful, because it is not the 
credibility but rather the reliability of the testimony of the good-faith witness that is at 
issue. 
Each of these factors was identified by Dr. Barden in his expert opinion and in his 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness of defense counsel. 
Although such memory research and analysis was warmly endorsed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Clopten, Dr. Barden's offer of the same analysis, using the same methodology 
and arriving at the same conclusions was completely discounted by the trial court. 
Appellant submits that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to ignore the 
rigorous scientific studies supporting the fallibility of eyewitness testimony of old events, 
in light of the Court of Appeals decision in Clopten, which had been decided prior to the 
hearing and especially in light of the Supreme Court's decision, which was decided 
subsequently and which expanded even further upon the notion of the necessity of expert 
testimony to the conduct of a fair trial. The State has not refuted these contentions in its 
response. 
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2. Scientific Studies by Dr. Elizabeth Loftus Show That the Reliability of 
Old Memories is Subject Is Subject to Distortion in a Manner Similar 
to the Factors that Render Eyewitness Testimony Fallible 
In his expert opinion that defense counsel was ineffective in this case, and in his 
testimony during the evidentiary hearing on the issue, Dr. Barden relied heavily on the 
scientific studies of the same expert favorably embraced by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Clopten, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus. Neither the trial court in its opinion, nor the State in its 
Brief, makes any attempt to refute the viability or scientific rigor of these studies or their 
clear application to the issues in this case. 
As Dr. Barden observed in his opinion: 
"the world expert in human memory distortions, Prof. Elizabeth Loftus, has 
written about this very topic. She wrote, "insidiously, memories can become 
scrambled, sometimes in the process of attempting to retrieve something. You 
might relate a story to a friend but unwittingly include some mistaken 
details. Later, as you attempt to recall the episode, you might come across your 
memory of the scrambled recall attempt instead of your original memory 
(misattribution). Memory is malleable. It is not, as is commonly thought, like a 
museum piece sitting in a display case." 
"Usually the scrambled memory does not matter very much. But if you are an 
eyewitness to a crime, your scrambled recall could send someone to prison. 
And, rather than feeling hesitant, you might feel perfectly sure of the truth of 
your memory . . . " (See, Loftus, E., Our changeable memories: legal and practical 
implications, Nature Reviews/Neuroscience, VOL 4 , MARCH 2003, pg 231). 
Expert Report and Declaration of Dr. R. Christopher Barden, |2.B.3, Ex. 6, April 29, 
2009 Evidentiary Hearing. 
Dr. Barden also refers to another study by Dr. Loftus, in which she conceived the 
"lost-in-mair technique to induce false memories. A sample experiment proceeded as 
such: an older brother asked his younger brother to try to remember a time in which the 
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younger had been lost in a shopping mall at age five. He initially recalled nothing, but 
after several days the child was able to produce a detailed recollection of the event. 
According to the older brother and family members, the younger brother had never been 
lost in a shopping mall; however this newly elucidated "false memory" became very real 
to the younger child. In a sample size of 24 participants, experimenters reported that a 
quarter of subjects falsely recalled being lost in the mall or a similar public place." 
Subsequent studies performed by a variety of researchers generated false memories of 
such extreme events as taking a hot-air balloon ride, being hospitalized overnight, having 
a bizarre accident at a family wedding, having nearly drowned but been rescued by a 
lifeguard, and being the victim of a vicious animal attack. Humans are very susceptible 
to the creation of false memories by suggestion and the misattribution of information to 
events that actually came from conversations, movies, books, or even dreams. Id., \ 
2.B.4. 
In this case, the testimony of Scott Carpenter and also the testimony of the 
allegedly corroborating witnesses was based on things that had occurred over a decade 
prior, when the witnesses were nine. As identified by Dr. Barden and as set forth in 
3
 See, e.g., Maryanne Carry, Charles G. Manning, Elizabeth F. Loftus and Steven 
J. Sherman, Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence 
That It Occurred, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, Vol. 3, NO. 2, pages 208-214; June 
1996. Loftus, E.F. (2003) Our changeable memories: Legal and practical implications. 
Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 4 , 231-234; Loftus, E.F., "Creating False Memories," 
Scientific American, September 1997, vol. 277, #3, pp. 70-75; Loftus, E.F., "Make-
Believe Memories," American Psychologist, Nov. 2003, pp. 867-73 and other references 
relied upon by Dr. Barden in reaching his expert opinion. 
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detail in the Appellant's Opening Brief and also in Section B, below, there are numerous 
intervening events that could, and most likely did, influence the memories of the 
witnesses. 
The State's assumption that memories formed in childhood and recalled more than 
a decade later are inherently reliable and not, therefore, subject to challenge, is erroneous. 
The observation that the witnesses were all adults and were not children at the time they 
testified at trial (State's Brief, p.34), underscores a failure to appreciate the science of 
human memory and the effect of time and intervening factors on the accuracy of a 
"memory" of a given event; it is not the age of the witness at the time of trial that is in 
issue, but rather the age at which the memory was formed; the amount of time that has 
transpired between the alleged event and the recollection; and the existence of distorting 
or contaminating events in the interim that is important. 
The testimony of defense counsel at the evidentiary hearing on ineffective 
assistance illustrates his lack of appreciation for these issues, and further underscores the 
insufficiency of his "consultation" with an expert in the field of memory science. When 
asked if his investigation of the eyewitnesses had yielded any information that would be 
beneficial to the defense, counsel replied: 
The only thing was - / wouldn 't call it useful - would be that some of the 
witnesses had learned about Mr. Willey under circumstances where they 
could have been influenced by media reports, newspaper reports, having 
gathered information from some source other than their actual memory." 
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, 31:10-15 [Packet Q] (emphasis supplied). 
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That the defense counsel did not consider it part of his job to investigate and 
explore the fact that the witnesses might not be testifying from their own "actual 
memory" - and that therefore their corroborating testimony is quite likely unreliable - is 
both incomprehensible and unconscionable. 
Contrary to the decision of the trial court and the arguments of the State, this 
cannot be considered an appropriate and informed defense strategy. The fact that there 
was purportedly corroborating testimony of an event that occurred twelve years prior 
cannot be a justification for failing to probe the reliability of that very testimony. 
The reasons on which the Utah Supreme Court based its conclusion that expert 
testimony to be essential to a fair trial when the reliability of eyewitness testimony is at 
issue apply with equal force to this case, where the memory of the eyewitnesses is over 
ten years old and demonstrably affected by distorting media coverage and other 
intervening events. The trial court erred when it failed to acknowledge the importance 
and necessity of expert testimony in a case that turned on the credibility of eyewitness 
recollection of events that had occurred more than a decade prior. 
B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing to Challenge the So-Called 
Corroborative Evidence of the Other Children in Scott Carpenter's 
Fourth Grade Class 
Scott Carpenter's testimony in this case was that when he was in fourth grade 
twelve years prior, he was sexually abused by his teacher on a virtually daily basis, while 
class was in session, in full view of the other children in the class. At trial, the State 
called as witnesses three other children who were in that same class, only one of whom 
11 
testified that she saw the genital fondling that Scott Carpenter had testified occurred on a 
regular basis. 
1. Defense Counsel Fails to Interview Most of the Eyewitnesses to the 
Events At Issue In This Case 
There were twenty-one other children in the class. Defense counsel called none 
of them. At the evidentiary hearing on ineffectiveness of defense counsel, defense 
counsel testified that he made the strategic decision not to interview these children, 
because the first couple of witnesses he spoke to "absolutely corroborated" Scott 
Carpenter's story. According to defense counsel's testimony, any corroboration of 
shoulder patting or back rubbing was bad and was so probative of Scott Carpenter's 
allegations of sexual abuse that it should be avoided at all costs. As defense counsel 
testified, in defense of his position: "The absence of evidence is better than the existence 
of evidence." Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, p. 73 [Packet Q]. Defense counsel 
acknowledged that he came to his decision after talking to only three of the students in 
the class. 
The State has argued that this decision was a legitimate trial strategy, but it was, in 
fact, dangerously uninformed and simplistic. It also violated defense counsel's basic 
duty to investigate, and should not have been made until after a complete investigation of 
all of the witnesses to the alleged event had been conducted. As Standard 4-4.1(a) of the 
ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function 
provides: 
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Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the 
case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and 
the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should include efforts to 
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and the law enforcement 
authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the facts constituting guilt 
or the accused's admissions or statements to the defense counsel constituting guilt 
or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function (3r Ed. 
1993). 
Courts, including the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) have embraced this standard. See also, In re Edward S., 173 
Cal.App.4th 387, 407 (2009)("A defense attorney who fails to investigate potentially 
exculpatory evidence, including evidence that might be used to impeach prosecution 
witnesses, renders deficient representation.") and People v. Jones, 11 Cal.Rptr. 3d 745 
(2010). 
Defense counsel has conceded that he only interviewed three of the twenty-five 
students in Scott Carpenter's fourth grade class, jumping immediately to the conclusion 
that their testimony was corroborative of Scott Carpenter even though the stories of those 
three witnesses diverged from each other and from the testimony of Scott Carpenter 
himself. Concluding that the testimony was dangerous and should be avoided, defense 
counsel also made no effort to discover whether these witnesses had been influenced by 
the significant media coverage that had surrounded Alan Willey's arrest;4 as set forth 
4
 Defense counsel recognized, prior to the first trial, that "Cache County and Logan 
are small, close-knit and fairly homogeneous communities" with only one newspaper, 
The Herald Journal As defense counsel acknowledged, on the day of the defendant was 
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above, defense counsel did not consider it "useful" that witnesses might be testifying 
based on something other than their actual memory. 
Although the State now argues that it was a legitimate strategy for defense counsel 
to stop his investigation after talking to only three of the students in the class, after the 
first trial ended in a hung jury the State itself set out to interview every child who had 
been in Scott Carpenter's fourth grade class over a decade earlier. The answers to the 
questionnaires were not helpful to the State's case: while there was general agreement 
among these witnesses that Scott Carpenter had been teacher's pet, and a general 
consensus that Alan Willey did, from time to time, pat Scott on the shoulder or even rub 
his back, the testimony was otherwise wildly inconsistent. Only one student testified to 
having seen crotch touching, Hillary Meacham, who the State called at trial. Other 
students said that they observed shoulder patting and back rubbing that "in retrospect" 
was inappropriate.5 Finally, several students said they had witnessed nothing at all and 
arrested, March 28, 2006, ABC TV ran a program in which unidentified men spoke from 
shadows, recollecting that Alan Willey had tickled them and rubbed their legs, and that 
they were "not surprised" about the charges against the defendant. The newspaper (at 
which, incidentally, two of the State's corroborating witnesses, Tyler Riggs and Melinda 
Blauer both worked), published no fewer than eight stories prior to the first trial, which 
the defense counsel characaterized as including "innuendos of Defendant's guilt." 
Defense counsel made these observations in support of a motion to change venue. Court 
Record, vol. 1, 75-103, attaching as Exhibits numerous press clippings reciting the 
charges and the evidence). 
5
 Although the State has argued that "eight more classmates witnessed prolonged 
skin-to-skin touching inside Scott's shirt," (State's Brief, p. 18), review of the actual 
questionnaires shows that at most, a couple of students said they had even seen a hand 
inside a shirt "a couple of times." Not one student observed having seen "prolonged 
skin-to-skin touching" even once, let alone on a daily basis as reported by Scott 
14 
thought that Alan Willey was a great teacher. See, Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18 and the 
record citations contained therein, including Ex. 3, Evidentiary Hearing of April 29, 
2009). 
If the distant memories of events witnessed by nine-year old children were in fact 
reliable and absolutely corroborative of Scott Carpenter's testimony, one would have 
expected more consistency between the stories. In fact, the only thing everyone agreed 
on was that Scott Carpenter was one of Alan Willey's favorite students. Most, but not 
all, of them agreed that Alan Willey had, on a few or more occasions, patted Scott on the 
back or shoulder. There was no consensus at all that Alan Willey had repeated fondled 
Scott Carpenter's penis, an event "corroborated" by only one of the witnesses. 
Shoulder pats (even unwanted ones) and being teacher's favorite are not, however, 
the stuff of which convictions for aggravated sexual abuse of a child are made. The trial 
was not about whether Alan Willey was weird, or even whether he was too affectionate 
with his students - it was about whether he had violated the provisions of a very specific 
criminal statute describing aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Touching the chest or 
back of a male child - even "skin-on-skin" - is not a crime under that statute. Eyewitness 
testimony that contradicted the occurrence of the acts proscribed by the statute of course 
has a distinct impact on the determination of the guilt of the defendant by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Carpenter. Again, the State simply assumes that even these statements are accurate and 
reliable. 
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We do not know whether, or the extent to which, these factors had an influence on 
the memories and testimony of Scott Carpenter's classmates because no one ever asked. 
There was no inquiry made about what they had read in the newspaper; what they had 
heard on the street; what they had seen on television; what they had heard at church; 
whether they had discussed the issue with their friends or family; whether any of them 
had discussed the allegations with each other; or any other of a myriad of questions that a 
memory expert could have designed to demonstrate how these factors might have 
influenced the witness's actual memories of long-ago childhood events. 
As defense counsel acknowledged, Logan is "small, close-knit, relatively 
homogeneous" community. For defense counsel to confidently assume that there was no 
connection, conversation or shared information between the actual and potential 
witnesses, is not a rational assumption in light of the the pervasive publicity. The State's 
attempt to brush aside the significance of all of these distorting influences on Ihe 
reliability of the memories of these witnesses is contrary to the accepted scientific 
opinions on the issue as detailed in Dr. Barden's scientifically grounded expert opinion, 
as explicated by the work of Dr. Loftus and others and as recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Clopten. 
2. Defense Counsel Has Admitted That That He Failed to Review A Key 
Taped Witness Interview Demonstrating Biased and Questionable 
Interviewing Techniques by the Lead Investigating Officer 
As set forth in detail in the Appellant's Opening Brief, between the first trial and 
the second trial, the defense was provided with a videotape interview of the lead 
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investigator engaging in interview techniques that bordered on witness tampering, 
including intimidation, suggesting to a witnesses what her testimony ought to be, and 
going about town telling people that Alan Willey was, beyond doubt, guilty of the alleged 
abuse. See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-19. 
This information, together with media bias already acknowledged by defense 
counsel, was a critical factor with respect to the propriety of the investigation and, in turn, 
the effect that these techniques had upon the reliability of the witness testimony. That 
defense counsel did not recognize that this same charged publicity - coupled with the 
questionable interrogation techniques of the lead police investigator - quite likely had a 
distorting effect on the allegedly corroborating testimony further demonstrates that, 
whatever consultation defense counsel had with a "memory expert," it was not sufficient. 
Defense counsel's decision not to use this evidence was not, as the State has 
argued, a legitimate trial strategy. Although the State contends that "the defense team 
reasonably investigated, but legitimately chose not to question the detective concerning 
the Paula Olsen interview" (State's Brief, p. 42), this is an overly generous 
characterization of defense counsel who testified that he never saw the tape of the Jason 
Olsen interview (Walter Bugden, Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, 197-199 
[PacketQ]), or who viewed the recording, but could not really remember very much 
about it, testifying that the tactics displayed were "the least of their problems." (Tara 
Isaacson, Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, 217-18 [Packet Q]). 
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Failure to make use of this evidence of memory influencing and distorting tactics 
on the part of the lead investigator is simply further evidence of defense counsel's failure 
to understand and recognize the importance of these factors on the reliability of the 
corroborating witnesses' testimony. It is not the importance of Paula Olsen to the trial, 
but rather the significance of the obvious bias of the lead investigative officer, and its 
effect on the investigation as a whole, that should have been thoroughly investigated by 
defense counsel. 
3. Failure to Probe the Reliability of the Eyewitness Testimony 
Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
At the evidentiary hearing on the issue of effectiveness of counsel, and again in 
the State's brief, the State spends much time and spills much ink over the supposed 
mountain of evidence supporting the Appellant's conviction. Again, this misses the point 
- Appellant does not dispute that the State submitted substantial evidence in support of its 
case and that an appeal on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence would be doomed 
to failure. 
The issue is not the quantity of the evidence, but rather its reliability, and whether 
defense counsel properly investigated that issue and provided the jury with sufficient 
tools with which to fairly and properly analyze the evidence. Imagine, for example that 
the matter at issue was whether a driver had been intoxicated and speeding while driving 
through an intersection and ultimately crashing into a light pole. Ten eyewitnesses all 
agree that they saw the defendant driving a red car at or about the time of the incident, 
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but they disagree as to how fast the car was going, whether the driver was behaving 
erratically, what direction the car was travelling, or even whether the car actually hit the 
pole. Moreover, some of the witnesses were asked, in their witness interviews, how fast 
the car had been going when it "smashed" into the pole and others were not. 
It would be inexcusable in that case if defense counsel elected not to demonstrate 
the inconsistency of the eyewitness testimony and the manner of questioning, simply 
because the witnesses all placed the defendant in his red car at or near the scene. Defense 
counsel's "strategic decision" in this case not to challenge the reliability or credibility of 
the allegedly corroborative evidence of the other children in Scott Carpenter's classroom 
is equally inexcusable. 
Defense accepted the testimony of the purportedly corroborating evidence at face 
value, making no attempt to determine its reliability. According to defense counsel's 
own admission, he never asked his memory expert, for assistance in evaluating the 
testimony of the other children in the class to determine whether it was corroborative or 
reliable, but rather simply informed him that it was. Given all of these considerations, 
6
 Dr. Barden testified about this phenomenon of how post-event misinformation can 
"recreate" a memory and change the details of it over time. As he stated: "For example, 
Loftus would show people a scene that they might have to testify about in court. They 
had cars crashing through a stop sign. And simply the way you ask the question, how 
fast were the cars going when they smashed together? How fast were the cars going when 
they hit? Changes that person's statement about how fast the car was going. If you say 
smashed, the miles per hour goes up." 265-66. 
7
 The fact that the alleged memory expert did not raise these issues in his 
conversations with defense counsel is further evidence that either the consultation was 
inadequate, or that the expert did not really understand the necessity of challenging 
reliability of the corroborative evidence, or both. 
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defense counsel's failure to elucidate for the jury the potential effect of these tainting 
factors on the credibility of the corroborating testimony is falls below the standard of 
effective representation required for a fair trial. 
C. Defense Counsel's Strategic Decisions Were Not Informed Decisions 
Defense counsel's decision not to use expert testimony during the second trial was 
not an informed decision, as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 
and State v. Hales 2007 UT 14 and therefore amounted to ineffective assistance at trial. 
Contrary to defense counsel's protestations and the State's position in its Brief, the 
existence of allegedly "corroborative" evidence does not contraindicate the need for 
expert testimony challenging it, but rather makes such a challenge even more critical to a 
valid defense. Defense counsel's failure to appreciate this point, which the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly understood in Clopten, renders his strategic trial decisions subject 
to question. 
The State has conceded that the testimony adduced at the first trial was favorable 
to the defense - as described in the State's Brief, after the first trial the State "plugged the 
holes" in its case. As defense counsel explained during the ineffectiveness hearing: 
But in the second trial Mr. Baird made a decision that we didn't know he 
would be making but made a decision not to call any of the 404(b) 
witnesses because he clearly concluded that the 404(b) witnesses allowed 
us to distract the jury from the central issue of whether Scott Carpenter has 
actually been sexually molested." 
Transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing, 31:20-25 [Packet Q]. 
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Although the State argues in its brief that defense counsel made a valid strategic 
decision to avoid the 404(b) witness testimony, this conclusion is belied by this 
testimony. It is the defense counsel'sjob to "distract the jury" from State's case, that 
is, put forth evidence (percipient and expert) and engage in cross-examination that 
effectively challenges the State's version of events. When the prosecutor appreciates 
that the 404(b) testimony was actually beneficial to the defense, it is not too difficult to 
conclude that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that himself. 
Given his stated view that the testimony of all the "corroborating" witnesses was 
fatal to the defendant, defense counsel should have been astonished when, after every bit 
of supposedly fatally damaging testimony was admitted during the first trial, that trial did 
not end in swift and immediate conviction. The State critically evaluated its trial 
strategy in light of this result, but defense counsel did not - he testified that he did not 
"for one minute" consider using any of the 404(b) testimony in Alan Willey's defense, 
nor did he discuss the outcome of the first trial with his "memory expert," including the 
useful demonstration by the "Oprah" witness of the exact distorting factors identified by 
Dr. Loftus in her scientific studies and by Dr. Barden in his testimony in this case. 
Defense counsel's off-the-cuff, informal discussions with Dr. Golding cannot be 
considered adequate to inform him of the value, scope and power of expert testimony 
regarding old memories; as stated before, the determination that expert testimony 
regarding the fallibility of old memories would be undermined by corroborating 
testimony that was, itself, over ten years old, is almost dispositive evidence of counsel's 
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failure to grasp the issue and his obligation to formulate a defense that challenged the 
validity of the testimony. Defense counsel's strategy should be further evaluated in 
light of the unrefuted evidence was that Dr. Loftus herself had been consulted by the 
defendant's family and had expressed a willingness to participate, yet defense counsel 
inexplicably refused to consult with the acknowledged leading expert on the science of 
human memory. 
In order for defense counsel's strategic trial decisions to be valid, they must be 
informed -[strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonably professional judgments support the limitation on 
the investigation." Strickland, supra, at 690-699. The defense counsel's decision that 
consultation with Dr. Loftus would not be useful, and introduction of expert testimony 
was not essential to a fair trial in this case, was not an informed decision but rather 
stemmed from counsel's premature and erroneous assumption that evidence of touching 
of any kind - even on a shoulder - was absolutely corroborative of allegations of 
aggravated sexual abuse in the open classroom, coupled with his complete failure to re-
evaluate this irrational assumption, or the strategic decisions based on it, after the first 
trial ended in a hung jury. 
Defendant was deprived of a fair trial by ineffective assistance of counsel and the 
verdict should be reversed. 
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D. Proper Investigation of the Factors Affecting the Reliability of Witness 
Testimony, Including the Use of a Memory Expert, Would Have Made 
a Difference to the Outcome of the Second Trial 
Appellant acknowledges that he is required to demonstrate that the outcome would 
likely have been different had the evidence against him been effectively challenged by 
his defense counsel. Ordinarily, this showing requires surmise on the part of the 
Appellant and speculation on the part of the reviewing court, but that is not the case here. 
Here, we have the unusual circumstance that there were two trials. At the first 
trial, all of the allegedly corroborating 404(b) witnesses testified, including the witness 
who saw Teri Hatcher talk about her abuse on the Oprah Winfrey show, googled the area 
where he had gone to elementary school and falsely "remembered" that he had been 
abused by Alan Willey in kindergarten after he read of Willey's arrest online. As set 
forth above, the State has essentially conceded that testimony of this obviously false 
memory was favorable to the defense by electing not use it in the second trial because it 
"distracted" from the issue of whether Scott Carpenter had been abused by Alan Willey. 
At the first trial, the defense argued (but did not present any evidence, other than 
the demonstration by the State's own witness of the principle) the fallibility often year 
old memories, and the jury did not convict. At the second trial, the State was not so 
helpful to the defense in presenting its case - it "plugged the holes." Defense counsel 
did not, however, do anything to shore up the defense, and failed to educate the jury in 
any way at all about the factors that might cause them to determine that the evidence 
presented by the State was unreliable, notwithstanding the substantial evidence of the 
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presence of those factors in this case and the defense counsel's own acknowledgment that 
some of the witnesses were testifying based on information other than their "actual 
memories." The second trial resulted in the conviction that has led to this appeal. 
Failure of defense counsel to test and probe the evidence, examine its credibility 
and use accepted scientific expert evidence to educate the jury regarding the factors that 
might cause a witness to "remember" something that had, in fact, never happened, fell 
below the level of defense that should be expected from such a seasoned professional as 
the defense counsel in this case. Contrary to the findings of the trial court on the 
ineffectiveness of defense counsel, and contrary to the arguments of the State in its Brief, 
it has been clearly demonstrated that if evidence demonstrating the fallibility human 
memory is made available to the jury, it has an effect on the outcome of the trial. 
Appellant has satisfied all of the criteria for demonstrating ineffective assistance of 
counsel in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The State in this case did its job; Appellant does not contend otherwise. It 
assembled evidence, put the defendant on trial and obtained a conviction. Defense 
counsel, however, did not do its job. It failed to investigate exculpatory evidence; failed 
to indentify essential expert testimony; failed to appreciate the impact of media, rogue 
police investigative techniques, gossip and the like on the accuracy of the memories of 
the twenty-five students in Scott Carpenter's fourth grade class, testifying after a lapse of 
twelve years between the trial and the events at issue. 
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When the State does its job, but the defense does not, the trial is not fair. For all 
the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Brief and in this Reply, Alan Willey did not get an 
effective defense. The jury verdict should be vacated and the case remanded. Appellant 
further requests that, given all the publicity in the case and the findings of the trial court 
in Logan regarding the trial court's opinion of the strength of the State's case and the 
clear guilt of the defendant, if the case is remanded, it should be to a trial court in Salt 
Lake County to assure the fairness and neutrality of any subsequent proceedings. 
September 9, 2010 
&n^& 
Sara Pfrommer 
Attorney for Alan Willey, Appellant 
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Abstract 
Counter-factual imaginings are known to have far reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if 
imagining events from one's past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology 
literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The 
concepts of cognitive availability and the source monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that 
imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad 
counterfactual imaginings (i.e., daydreams and fantasies) but usually do not confuse them with past 
experiences. To determine the effects of imagining a childhood event, we pretested subjects on how confident 
they were that a number of childhood events had happened, asked them to imagine some of those events, and 
then gathered new confidence measures. For each of the target items, imagination inflated confidence that the 
event had occurred in childhood. We discuss implications for situations in which imagination is used as an aid in 
searching for presumably lost memories. 
People often imagine the past as being different from what it really was. Many investigators have argued that 
people spontaneously imagine alternatives to real events more in some settings than in others. These mental 
musings, called counterfactual thinking, have far reaching implications. They influence, for example, judgments 
of regret, perceived happiness, and causality (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). For example, in one study subjects 
assigned more blame to an individual for a bad outcome when counterfactual thoughts-thoughts of what might 
have been done instead-would have undone the bad outcome ( Wells & Gavanski,1989). The question we ask 
here is whether these counterfactual imaginings also affect a person's memory for the past. For example, 
suppose you imagined stumbling on something in your house, and before you realize what is happening you've 
shattered a window with your hand. Would you later be more likely to claim that this unfortunate event had 
happened to you? 
We already know, from the social psychology literature, that imagining a future event increases the subjective 
likelihood that the event will occur (Carroll, 1978; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982; Sherman, Cialdini, 
Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). For example, consider Carroll's (1978) study on the power of imagination. 
Before the 1976 presidential election, subjects were asked to imagine either Carter or Ford winning the election. 
They were then asked to predict the outcome of the election using a scale from 0 (sure Carter will win ) to 100 
{sure Ford will win). Subjects who imagined that Carter had won were more certain that he eventually would; 
similarly, those who imagined Ford had won were more certain that he would later win. 
But imagination does not always have these consequences. One determining variable is the ease with which 
the event can be imagined. Sherman et al. (1985) asked subjects to imagine getting a disease whose 
symptoms were either easy or difficult to imagine. The ease with which subjects stated they could imagine the 
symptoms was tied to likelihood estimates: Those who judged the symptoms as easy to imagine also tended to 
estimate the disease as more likely to occur; those who thought the symptoms were difficult to imagine thought 
it less likely to occur. Sherman et al. suggested that easily imagined future events somehow become more 
"available" in the sense pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) research on judgment and decision 
making. Tversky and Kahneman proposed that when people are given uncertain conditions and asked to make 
outcome likelihood judgments, the more easily pictured outcomes are more "cognitively available," and seen as 
more likely. Put in different terms, the act of imagination may provide scaffolding, so that when subjects are 
tested, it is easier for them to build on this memorial framework. Perhaps if subjects imagined stumbling and 
shattering a window as a child, the event might also become more available, and subjects would become more 
confident that it had occurred. 
Imagining a childhood event might also change memory for it by inducing source attribution errors (Johnson, 
1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Simply put, source attribution errors occur when information is 
remembered, but its source is remembered incorrectly or not remembered at all. Koehler (1991) argued 
explicitly that source attribution errors were partly responsible for the increased confidence in the probability of 
imagined future events. He noted that the mere act of imagining a scenario forces people to create an alternate 
reality for a short time and to fit the imagined facts into their existing knowledge of the world. The imagination 
procedure generates event information that subjects may remember, even if they don't remember the source of 
the information. Event information becomes more available, and therefore more plausible, subjects become 
more confident that the event will occur. 
A similar line of argument leads us to predict that subjects will also become more confident that imagined past 
events had occurred. The rationale for this prediction is straightforward. Imagination will produce event 
information, and the event information may become more accessible, but its source may be forgotten or mis-
remembered. When subjects are later tested, the availability might make the past event seem more plausible, 
and they might become more confident that the past event had actually occurred. 
There is even reason to believe that source confusion might be especially acute for the very distant events of 
childhood. For example, Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988) asked subjects to think of actual or 
imagined personal events from either the recent past or childhood and then to rate these memories on 39 
different characteristics. There were far fewer significant differences (3/39) between actual and imagined 
childhood events than for actual and imagined recent events (20/39). Put another way, both experienced and 
imagined childhood memories contain far fewer qualitative differences that can be used to distinguish between 
what actually happened from what was only imagined. Perhaps the act of imagining a childhood event 
generates only diffuse information about it, but if even genuine childhood memories contain similar information, 
subjects might not have a reliable way of distinguishing between childhood fact and fantasy. In short, the act of 
imagining may generate information whose source later becomes confused, resulting in a stronger belief that 
the imagined childhood event actually occurred. Thus, source monitoring research suggests why imagining a 
childhood window-shattering accident might promote greater confidence later that it actually occurred. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that imagining a childhood event will not increase confidence 
that it did occur. After all, people often imagine winning a multimillion dollar lottery jackpot, but they don't fool 
themselves into thinking that they have actually done so. Most people daydream and imagine a variety of 
scenarios and outcomes yet don't routinely get confused between what really happened and what did not. 
Another reason to believe that imagination may have no effect on childhood memories is that subjects could 
make the conscious connection between imagining an event and being asked to make a judgment about it. 
Subjects who remember having imagined the event might become confident that their feeling of familiarity was 
attributable only to the recent act of imagining (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989). In fact, these subjects might 
become more certain that the event never occurred than if they had been asked the very same question prior to 
the act of imagining. 
So, a goal of the present research was to determine whether imagination leads to increased confidence that the 
event occurred. Suppose imagining a childhood event does promote this increased confidence (which we term 
imagination inflation); why should we care? One reason is the puzzle of how people can come to remember 
their past in ways that diverge sharply from reality. For instance, some people remember their past in more 
socially desirable ways (Abelson, Loftus, & Greenwald, 1992), and people are often very confident about these 
memories. But the possibility of imagination inflation is not just theoretically interesting, for there are real world 
instances in which imagination is deliberately used as a memory recall tool. Law enforcement personnel 
sometimes repeatedly direct a suspect to imagine having participated in a criminal act as a means of obtaining 
a confession (Ofshe, 1992). In addition, some mental health professionals encourage a client to imagine an 
abusive childhood event as a way of recovering hidden memories. Maltz's (1991) specific technique is just one 
of many published examples: "Spend time imagining that you were sexually abused, without worrying about 
accuracy, proving anything, or having your ideas make sense. As you give rein to your imagination, let your 
intuitions guide your thoughts" (p. 50). If counterfactual imaginings can alter memory, we may have some 
evidence about a partial cause of these phenomena, another piece of the puzzle. 
To explore whether imagination inflation occurs, we developed a three stage procedure. First we asked subjects 
about a long list of possible childhood events, and they indicated whether or not these events had happened to 
them as children. Two weeks later, we asked them to imagine a few of these events. Finally, we gave the long 
list of possible childhood events to our subjects again, and they indicated whether or not the events had 
happened to them. To be specific, consider a group of subjects who all said that it was unlikely that they had 
ever broken a window with their hand. Later they imagine a scenario in which this happened to them, complete 
with how they tripped and fell, who else was there, and how they felt. Would these subjects later think it was 
more likely that they had broken a window with their hand as a child? Such a result would constitute empirical 
support for the hypothesis of imagination inflation. 
Method 
Subjects 
Forty-six subjects enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the University of Washington participated for 
course credit during the pretest. Of these, 38 completed all phases of the study. 
Materials 
A 40 item Life Events Inventory (LEI) was administered during the first session. It asked subjects to consider 
how certain they were that each event (or a very similar one) had or had not happened to them before the age 
of 10 (e.g., "Broke a window with your hand"; 1 = definitely did not happen and 8 = definitely did happen). They 
responded by circling the appropriate point on an 8 point scale. Three judges used pretest data to choose target 
items. Although the judges' selection criteria were informal, they were systematic in that they chose event items 
whose means indicated that they probably did not occur. The emergency room item did not fit the criteria, but it 
was selected as a target because it has been used in another study (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995). We 
report pretest descriptive statistics for these items in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Pretest answers for critical events 
Event M SD Mdn Range Percent 1-4* 
Got in trouble for calling 911. 
Had to go to the emergency room late at night. 
Found a $10 bill in a parking lot. 
Won a stuffed animal at a carnival game. 
Gave someone a haircut. 
Had a lifeguard pull you out of the water. 
Got stuck in a tree and had to have someone help you down. 1.87 1.93 1.0 
Broke a window with your hand. 
Overall 
*1-4, responses on the eight-itme scale indicating that a given event probably did not happen. 
Procedure 
Subjects participated in two sessions, in groups ranging from 1 to 10 each. In Session I, they were told that the 
experimenters were interested in how vividly and completely people could imagine events, and that they would 
complete the LEI to gather baseline data on how frequently these events actually occurred. Subjects then 
completed the LEI at their own pace. 
In Session 2, 2 weeks later, the eight items were split into two, fourteen subsets. Subsets were randomly 
assigned to subjects, who were then asked to imagine the four critical items in that subset, while the other 
subset served as a control. For instance, Subject 1 imagined the four events in Subset A, and did not imagine 
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the four events in Subset B; Subject 2 imagined the four events in Subset B but did not imagine the four events 
in Subset A. In both cases, items were imagined in specific steps. 
Subjects were told that they would imagine some events that were described in packets that were on their 
desks. They were told that each page of the packet had a description of the events they were to imagine, as 
well as some questions about what they imagined. Subjects were instructed not to read ahead. Then the 
experimenter said, 
You are going to imagine several events. Each time, you will read a brief description of an event. 
You will be given a few moments to picture the event, and then you will answer some questions 
about the image. You will be given more details to imagine, and then take a few moments to 
picture them. Then you will answer some questions about your image. Try to picture each event as 
clearly and completely as you can. It may help you to form a more complete mental picture if you 
include familiar places, people, and things in the imagined event. Also, close your eyes if that helps 
your imagination. 
Subjects were asked if they had any questions about the instructions. When they were ready to begin, they 
turned over their packet and the experimenter began with the first event. First, the experimenter read a 
sentence or two to create the event setting: "Imagine that it's after school and you are playing in the house. You 
hear a strange noise outside, so you run to the window to see what made the noise. As you are running, your 
feet catch on something and you trip and fall." Subjects were given between 20 and 60 sec to imagine the event 
that each experimenter read. If the experimenter observed that all subjects in a given session had completed 
their imagination task at the end of 20 sec, the experimenter moved to the next phase. If, however, some 
subjects were still engaged in the imagination task, the experimenter waited until a maximum of 60 sec had 
passed. Subjects then wrote answers to short questions in their booklets. These questions were included to 
encourage compliance ("What did you trip on?"). The experimenter then read the action part of the event: "As 
you're falling you reach out to catch yourself and your hand goes through the window. As the window breaks 
you get cut and there's some blood." Subjects again completed short questions ("What are you likely to do 
next?"). This basic procedure was repeated for ail four target items, and lasted about 2 min per item. Then the 
experimenter pretended to be slightly panicked, told the subjects that their original LEIs had been misplaced, 
and asked them to complete another copy. (No specific instruction was given as to whether subjects should fill it 
out as they had before.) In fact, this administration of the LEI was the posttest. Finally, subjects were debriefed. 
Results 
The primary question in this study is whether imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. 
Before addressing this question, we need to expand on our hypothesis by distinguishing between childhood 
events judged unlikely to have happened versus childhood events judged likely to have happened. Our interest 
was in events that were unlikely to have happened, because in this condition subjects must be using their 
imaginations to create an alternate reality. On the other hand, if subjects are asked to imagine an event that 
they previously said had happened to them, they might simply be recalling it—not imagining it. Recent research 
suggests that when subjects imagine something that actually did happen to them, the imagining task actually 
becomes a remembering task (Sarbin, 1995). Thus, we focused first and foremost on what happens when 
people imagine an event, not when they recall one. 
We now turn our attention to events that were judged as unlikely to have happened, confining our analysis to 
the initial "did not happen" responses. These pretest responses constitute 76% of the total data; put another 
way, each subject reported that roughly 6/8 critical items probably did not happen (responses of 1-4). Of course, 
the eight critical items differed in how likely they were to produce a 1-4 response. A high of 92% of subjects 
responded in the 1-4 range for "Got stuck in a tree and had to have someone help you down," while 45% 
produced a 1-4 response to "Had to go to the emergency room late at night." Across all items, the mean 
number of subjects who initially said an event did not happen was 29 (74%), and the median was 31 (80%). 
To determine if imagination caused these subjects to become more confident that an event had occurred, we 
examined whether subjects moved up or down the scale. We calculated, for each critical item, the percentage of 
subjects whose responses increased, decreased, or did not change from the first to the second administration of 
the LEI test. We collapsed these change scores across all subjects and items, and display them separately 
according to whether or not the critical event was imagined. These data, for the 112 imagined items and 119 not 
imagined items, are shown in Figure 1 . Of particular interest are the positive change scores, which indicate that 
subjects move in the direction of becoming more confident that the event had happened to them. 
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Figure 1. Percent of events staying the same, increasing, and 
decreasing for subjects who initially responded 1 to 4 (responses 
indicating that the critical items probably did not happen). 
As Figure 1 shows, the majority of scores did not change (57% in the imagined condition and 65% in the not-
imagined condition). Additionally, when subjects did change their ratings, positive change scores were more 
likely to occur than were negative ones. But for the purposes of the present experiment, the most interesting 
result is found by comparing the bars on the extreme right of the figure: There was more positive change in the 
imagined items (34%) than for the not imagined items (25%). In other words, subjects who initially reported that 
an event did not happen, but then imagined that it had, were more likely to increase their confidence that it had 
occurred when asked about it later than were subjects who did not imagine the event. However, because these 
data were obtained by combining ail 1-4 responses from all subjects, individual subjects contributed different 
numbers of events, so overall statistical comparisons cannot be made at this level. We offer these results only 
for illustrative purposes, and now direct our attention to each event item. 
Would this intriguing pattern repeat for the event items individually? For each of the eight critical items we 
calculated the percentage of positive change. Figure 2 shows these data displayed according to whether or not 
the critical event was imagined. For each item, the right hand bar reveals the percentage of subjects with 
increased confidence after imagining the event. A paired t test treating items as cases showed that the mean 
difference was 8.2% greater for imagined items than for not imagined items: this difference was significant [t(7) 
= 5.48, p = .0009, SE = 1.49, two tailed, adjusted power at alpha = .05 was .97]. The effect size, calculated as 
[mean difference/SDnot imagined]. w a s a medium to large 0.72. So, for example, in the "Broke window" event. 
24% of subjects who imagined the event increased their subjective confidence that it had happened to them, 
while the corresponding figure for subjects who had not imagined it was only 12%. 
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Figure 2. Percent of subjects who increased on each item (for 
subjects who initially responded 1-4; that it, responses indicating that 
the critical items probably did not happen). 
Why does imagining an event lead to more positive changes than not imagining the event? One possible 
explanation is that the act of imagination simply makes the event seem more familiar at the time the posttest 
LEI is completed. Another possibility, however, is that the act of imagination reminds some subjects of a true 
experience from their past. If this "reminder" hypothesis is correct, we might expect to see at least some 
instances in which subjects initially give a low score indicating that the event probably hadn't happened to them, 
but the second time jump to a score of 8, indicating that the event definitely did happen to them. On the other 
hand, if some subjects do make a "big jump" (i.e., they move from an initial score of 1-4 to a final score of 8), it 
may not be because they remember a genuine experience at all: It may be that imagining the event makes it 
seem very real, and subjects become quite sure that it happened. 
These are highly speculative inferences, and they rest on the assumption that being reminded of a genuine 
event causes one to be certain. However, to explore the possibilities, we calculated the number of "big jumps," 
defined as an increase to a score of 8 on the posttest. Such jumps were relatively rare, occurring in only 6 of the 
112 imagined items, and in 2 of the 119 not imagined items. These "big jumpers" were found in the following 
items from Table 1 (cases are in parentheses): "Found $10" (2 imagined); "Lifeguard" (2 imagined); "Emergency 
room" (1 not imagined); "Stuffed animal" (1 imagined); and "Haircut" (1 imagined, 1 not imagined). When these 
cases were removed from the analysis and change scores were collapsed across subjects and items, there was 
still an overall tendency toward imagination inflation. That is, there were still more positive change scores for 
imagined than not imagined subjects (29.9% vs. 23.4%), and all but the "Lifeguard" item still showed an 
imagination effect. Over the eight items, the mean difference was 6.55% greater change in imagined items than 
not imagined items. A paired t test treating items as cases showed that this mean difference was significant [t(7) 
= 3.02, p = .01, SE = 2.17, two tailed; adjusted power at alpha = .05 was .53]. Effect size was a medium .55. 
What kinds of change scores were produced by the subjects who originally did not think an event happened to 
them, and did not imagine it? Let us return to Figure 2 and examine what happened to these subjects. The left-
hand bar for each item shows the percentage of subjects with positive change scores after merely being asked 
about the event twice, on the pretest and posttest. A paired t test treating items as cases showed that when 
subjects did change their responses between the first and second LEI tests, the percentage of subjects with 
positive change scores was significantly greater than the percentage with negative change scores [mean 
difference = 13.9%, f(7) = 2.67, p = .032, SE = 5.20, two tailed; adjusted power at alpha = .05 was .41]. For 
instance, 43% of subjects who took only the pretest and posttest became more confident that they had found a 
$10 bill, and 7% of them became less confident. Thus, even when subjects who did not imagine an event 
changed their answers, they tended to report greater rather than less confidence that it had occurred. Did these 
subjects develop false memories because event items were repeated? Of course, there are other explanations 
for this result. Briefly, it could be regression to the mean. It could be that the second test promotes more 
accurate recall, or it could be that the second test causes the item to become more plausible, and that 
increased confidence does not point to completely developed false memories so much as to increased 
plausibility that they might have occurred. These issues are discussed in more depth later. 
We have shown that when subjects imagine an event they do not think happened, they tend to become more 
confident that it did happen. But what about subjects who initially think an event probably did happen? Would 
imagination make them even more confident that an event had occurred? Although not the main question in our 
research, it is worth addressing. To examine the effect of imagination on events thought likely to have 
happened, we collapsed change scores for them across all subjects and items. We included only items initially 
judged as 5-7, removing the data for items initially reported as an 8 because these ratings could not increase. 
The most common outcome among these "probably did happen" subjects in the imagined condition was to stay 
the same, and the most common change in the not imagined condition was to become less confident. 
Additionally, positive change occurred more often for not imagined items than for imagined items (36%, or 8/22, 
vs. 19%, or 4/21). However, because there were so few items, statistical analysis is inappropriate, and we avoid 
further interpretation. 
Discussion 
The major result from this experiment is that imagining a self-reported counterfactual event increased 
confidence that the event did happen. This result complements earlier findings on the power of imagination to 
increase people's subjective sense of the probability that a future event will occur (see, e.g.. Sherman et al., 
1985). Why should imagination influence reports of both future and past events in a similar way? On the face of 
it, future events and past events do not seem to have much in common. After all, future events are obviously 
not subject to memory reconstruction (as judged against objective, historical truth), but past events are. For 
instance, witnessed events are often reported inaccurately (Belli. 1989); more to the point, personal experiences 
are also subject to various memory distortions (Loftus, 1993). But Johnson and Sherman (1990) argued for less 
simplistic categories than mere past, present, and future. In their view, both past and future are constructions of 
the present. The present constantly flows into the past, so the past is always changing, and the future is always 
being constrained by this changing past. J.1. Gibson (1977/1986) made a similar point when he challenged 
psychologists to find the place where the present stops and the past takes over. That confidence promoting 
effects are found for both future and past events suggests that the timeline is not necessarily so neatly carved 
up into past, present, and future. 
Imagination did not have a systematic effect on events that were initially judged to have happened. Of course, 
the mental activity involved in imagining an actual past event is probably very different from the mental activity 
involved when one imagines something that did not happen. In other words, an instruction to imagine an event 
that did not happen may lead people to create an alternate reality, but an instruction to imagine an event that 
did happen may lead them simply to recall the past event. Thus the mental processes involved when people 
imagine the real versus the unreal past may be quite different. 
In addition to the finding that the act of imagination promotes greater likelihood estimates, there was also a 
slight tendency for the repeating of an item to produce higher scores. For example, being asked if you had ever 
broken a window with your hand, then being asked again 2 weeks later, may lead to a small increase in 
likelihood scores—even without any intervening imagination. Of course, this increase might be nothing more than 
regression to the mean, but in other domains an analogous "repetition" effect has been found. For example, 
Arkes and colleagues Arkes, Boehm. & Xu, 1991; Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989) have shown that validity 
ratings of true and false statements of fact that have been repeated are greater than validity ratings of 
unrepeated statements. Even with repeated tests, the largest gains in validity occur between the first and 
second tests. 
Why should there be any gain at all in validity? Subjects do not have access to new, supporting information; 
they simply read the propositions again. One explanation that Arkes and his colleagues have offered for the 
repetition effect is that subjects tend to rely on familiarity as one measure of validity, even when the facts are 
constant. In other words, truth is inferred on the basis of what might be an easier cognitive route: It may be 
easier to judge the familiarity of content than it is to judge the content itself. In the context of imagination 
inflation, then, when subjects read an event in the second LEI, they may take the familiarity of the item to mean 
that it happened. Of course, such a mechanism is a classic case of source confusion, and it is worth repeating 
(if only to increase the validity of our argument) that source confusion is one of the explanations for the effects 
seen in the imagine the future literature (Koehler, 1991). This entire line of reasoning is similar to that in 
arguments made about the venerable "sleeper effect" (Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1988), in 
which content and source eventually become dissociated, and a proposition that would immediately have been 
judged invalid (because its source was suspect) is now judged as true. 
In short, if the work of Arkes et al. (1989, 1991) shows that asking twice about a purported fact results in higher 
validity ratings, it seems plausible that asking twice about a purported event may result in higher likelihood 
estimates. Perhaps pondering whether or not an event occurred involves a subset of the same strategies that 
are involved in imagination. On the other hand, we should exercise caution in going too tar afield with a 
discussion of repetition effects; the effects observed In the present experiment might actually be explained by 
regression to the mean, and research is needed to specifically investigate the possibility of a repetition effect for 
past events. 
Of course, there are other explanations for the present results. One account for at least some of these data is 
what we will call the reinterpretation hypothesis. It supposes that a given item is interpreted more broadly on the 
LEI posttest than it is on the pretest. In other words, the item expands to accommodate the event. The 
reinterpretation mechanism is entirely plausible, and it is not clear that it would generally work to produce 
imagination inflation. Reinterpretation could easily lead to imagination deflation. To see why, consider that the 
imagination procedure leads subjects to imagine a specific, complex scenario in which they are the 
protagonists. Thus, the "imagined " subjects should have more constrained item interpretations, and the "not 
imagined" subjects should have a greater tendency to reinterpret items more broadly, permitting more instances 
of events that fit the item; such a pattern would work against the imagination inflation effect. In short, a 
reinterpretation mechanism might inflate confidence in some item and event combinations, and deflate 
confidence in others. 
Another explanation for the increased confidence we observed after imagination involves the concept of 
hypermnesia. Hypermnesia is the tendency toward increased recall over successive tests. In a typical 
hypermnesia experiment, subjects study word lists and then take several successive tests. Recall performance 
often improves steadily over repeated testing (e.g.. Roediger & Payne, 1985). Under the hypermnesia 
explanation, the design of the present experiment merely promotes the increasingly accurate recall of genuinely 
experienced events. For instance, the first LEI test is the first occasion to think about an event, and it thus 
produces the least accurate memory. The second test produces more accurate memory than the first, and the 
act of imagination is yet another chance to think about the target event. Subjects who Imagine an event are 
given an additional opportunity to think about it, which explains imagination inflation. The newly remembered 
event could conceivably be one that fits the LEI item well, or one that fits somewhat. 
We cannot rule out the hypermnesia possibility given the data we collected here. Perhaps imagination inflation 
is sometimes due to new genuine memories, and sometime to enhanced confidence about false memories. This 
is a question worthy of further research with more probative methods. Before leaving the topic of hypermnesia, 
however, we note two points about how the present study differs considerably from the typical hypermnesia 
study. The first difference is on what is being measured. The relatively neat content of hypermnesiac memories 
(see. e.g., Roediger & Payne. 1985) may not generalize to the messy complexity of real life memories (see. 
e.g., Neisser, 1986). The second difference is in how these memories are measured. Hypermnesia is found 
with recall tests, but not with recognition tests (Payne & Roediger, 1987). However, we used a test that cannot 
be categorized neatly as either recall or recognition. Subjects were asked to indicate which of 40 possible 
childhood experiences had occurred. The items did not describe very simple experiences. Instead, they 
described events of some complexity, in that multiple idea units were in all of the critical items (except for the 
"Haircut event"; see Table 1). For example, subjects were not asked if they had ever found any amount of 
money anywhere at any time in their lives; they were asked if they had ever found a $10 bill in a parking lot 
before they were 10 years old. 
In the present research, we do not know if imagining the event itself might cause imagination inflation, or if one 
must be the agent in the event. Source confusions might be increased (and imagination inflation be most 
pronounced) when subjects imagine themselves, say, finding a $10 bill in a parking lot, but not if they imagine 
Bill Clinton finding the same $10 bill. Imagining oneself should create more kinds of weak information (e.g., 
weak kinesthetic and haptic information) that could later increase familiarity. We also do not know which 
subjects in which events-if any-recognized that an LEI item asked about an event that had been imagined 
several minutes earlier. Future research is needed to ascertain whether subjects are drawing this link, and not 
showing imagination inflation when they do. Even if subjects do make a conscious link between the LEI item 
and the imagination exercise, we might still see an imagination effect. For instance, these subjects might not 
think that all of the familiarity associated with the asked about event was due to the earlier act of imagination, or 
they might think that the event is familiar for reasons in addition to imagining it. More to the point, if some 
subjects were indeed meeting the demand of the experiment by deliberately inflating their scores, we should 
have seen increased confidence among those subjects who originally were confident that a given event had 
happened. Instead, we saw no particular pattern in that category. 
These results suggest appropriate restraint in situations in which imagination is used as an aid in searching for 
or shoring up presumably lost memories. When the police repeatedly ask a suspect to imagine his possible role 
in a murder he does not remember, or when a mental health processional repeatedly encourages a client to 
imagine an abusive childhood event, these imagination activities may unknowingly promote a greater belief that 
particular episodes occurred. The search for fact may create a fiction. Such is the power of imagination, long 
ago recognized by Keats (1817, cited in Bartlett. 1992, p. 417), who said, "The Imagination may be compared to 
Adam's dream—he awoke and found it truth." 
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Our changeable memories: 
legal and practical implications 
Elizabeth Loftus 
The malleability of memory is becoming 
increasingly clear. Many influences can cause 
memories to change or even be created 
anew, including our imaginations and the 
leading questions or different recollections of 
others. The knowledge that we cannot rely 
on our memories, however compelling they 
might be, leads to questions about the 
validity of criminal convictions that are based 
largely on the testimony of victims or 
witnesses. Our scientific understanding of 
memory should be used to help the legal 
system to navigate this minefield. 
Memories are precious. They give us identity. 
They create a shared past that bonds us with 
family and friends. They seem fixed, like con-
crete, so that if you 'stepped' on them they 
would still be there as they always were. 
But memories are not fixed. Everyday 
experience tells us that they can be lost, but 
they can also be drastically changed or even 
created. Inaccurate memories can sometimes 
be as compelling and 'real' as an accurate 
memory. In this article, I discuss the ways in 
which memories can be reshaped and their 
implications for the legal system. If we cannot 
believe our own memories, how can we know 
whether the memories of a victim or a witness 
are accurate? 
Remaking memories 
We are all familiar with temporary memory 
problems. "I can't remember the right word," 
says a colleague at a cocktail party. "Is it 
senility?" I reply: "Can you remember the 
word later?" And the usual answer will be yes, 
proving that the information was not lost, 
but only temporarily unavailable. Retrieval 
problems are common. 
However, there are also problems with 
storing something new. This usually occurs 
simply because the person concerned is not 
paying attention. But some people are unable 
to store new information even if they are pay-
ing attention and have the opportunity to 
repeat the new information over and over 
again — several hours later, it is gone. Such 
people, including patients with Alzheimer's 
disease, might not even complain about 
'losing their memory' because they do not 
realize that anything is missing1. 
More insidiously, memories can become 
scrambled, sometimes in the process of 
attempting to retrieve something. You might 
relate a story to a friend but unwittingly 
include some mistaken details. Later, as you 
attempt to recall the episode, you might come 
across your memory of the scrambled recall 
attempt instead of your original memory. 
Memory is malleable. It is not, as is com-
monly thought, like a museum piece sitting in 
a display case. "Memory is," as the Uruguayan 
novelist Eduardo Galeano once said, "born 
every day, springing from the past, and set 
against it."2 
Usually the scrambled memory does not 
matter very much. But if you are an eye-
witness to a crime, your scrambled recall 
could send someone to prison. And, rather 
than feeling hesitant, you might feel perfectly 
sure of the truth of your memory. The history 
of the United States justice system, like those 
of other countries, is littered with wrongful 
convictions made on the basis of mistaken 
memories3. Huff recently estimated4 that 
about 7,500 people arrested for serious crimes 
were wrongly convicted in the United States 
in 1999. He further noted that the rate is 
thought to be much lower in Great Britain, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many 
other nations, especially those that have 
established procedures for reviewing cases 
involving the potential of wrongful conviction. 
Ronald Cotton, a North Carolina prisoner 
who was convicted in 1986 of raping 
a 22-year-old college student, Jennifer 
Thompson, puts a human face on these 
cases. Thompson stood up on the stand, put 
her hand on the Bible and swore to tell the 
truth. On the basis of her testimony, Cotton 
was sentenced to prison for life. Eventually, 
DNA testing — which began 11 years after 
Thompson had first identified Cotton — 
proved his innocence. Another man, Bobby 
Poole, pleaded guilty to the crime3. 
Faulty memory is not just about picking 
the wrong person. Memory problems were 
also evident during the sniper attacks that 
killed ten people in the Washington DC area 
in 2002 (see for example, REF. 5). Witnesses 
reported seeing a white truck or van fleeing 
several of the crime scenes. It seems that a 
white vehicle might have been near one of the 
first shootings and media repetition of this 
information contaminated the memories of 
witnesses to later attacks, making them more 
likely to remember white trucks. When 
caught, the sniper suspects were driving a blue 
car. Were we observing unwitting memory 
contamination on a nationwide scale? 
Witnesses can be wrong for several rea-
sons. A key reason is that they pick up infor-
mation from other sources; they combine bits 
of memory from different experiences. A 
growing body of research shows that memory 
more closely resembles a synthesis of experi-
ences than a replay of a videotape6. Three 
decades ago, a method of studying memory 
distortions was introduced. People watched a 
simulated crime or accident. Later they were 
given erroneous information about the details 
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of the event, such as the false detail that a man 
had curly rather than straight hair. Many of 
these people later claimed that they had seen a 
curly-haired person7. Studies such as this 
showed how leading questions or other forms 
of misinformation could contaminate the 
memories of witnesses about events that they 
had recently experienced8. 
In the past decade, the challenges have 
become greater. Newer studies showed that 
you could do more than change a detail here 
and there in someone's memory. You could 
actually make people believe that a childhood 
experience had occurred when in fact it never 
happened. Examples include being lost in a 
shopping mall for an extended period of time, 
being rescued by a lifeguard, or surviving a 
vicious animal attack9 12. How is this possible? 
In our studies, we enlist family members to 
help us to persuade their relatives that the 
events occurred. This method has led about a 
quarter of our subjects to believe that they 
were lost in a shopping mall for an extended 
period of time, and were ultimately rescued by 
an elderly person and reunited with their fam-
ilies. In other studies, we engaged people in 
guided imagination exercises. We asked people 
to imagine for a minute that as a child they 
had tripped and broken a window with their 
hand. Later, many of them became confident 
that the event had occurred. In other studies, 
we encouraged people to read stories and tes-
timonials about witnessing demonic posses-
sion, and even these raised confidence that this 
rather implausible event had happened. 
One recurring issue for memory distor-
tion research is the question of whether the 
events being reported after such a manipula-
tion might have actually happened. Perhaps 
the subject did break a window but had for-
gotten about it — the imagination exercise 
might have triggered a true memory rather 
than planting a false one. To prove that false 
memories can be insinuated into memory by 
these suggestive techniques, researchers have 
tried to plant memories that would be highly 
implausible or impossible. For example, one 
set of studies asked people to evaluate adver-
tising copy. They were shown a fake print 
advertisement that described a visit to 
Disneyland and how they met and shook 
hands with Bugs Bunny. Later, 16% of these 
subjects said that they remembered meeting 
and shaking hands with Bugs Bunny13. In fol-
low-up research carried out by Grinley in my 
laboratory, several presentations of fake 
advertisments involving Bugs Bunny at 
Disneyland resulted in 25-35% of subjects 
claiming to have met Bugs BunnyM. 
Moreover, when these subjects were subse-
quently asked to report precisely what they 
remembered about their encounter with Bugs 
Bunny, 62% remembered shaking his hand 
and 46% remembered hugging him. A few 
people remembered touching his ears or tail. 
One person remembered that he was holding 
a carrot. The scenes described in the adver-
tisement never occurred, because Bugs Bunny 
is a Warner Bros, cartoon character and 
would not be featured at a Disney property. 
"One of the cleverest and 
most powerful techniques for 
planting highly implausible 
false memories involves the 
use of fake photographs." 
Other 'impossible' memories have been 
recently planted in British students15. The false 
event was "having a nurse remove a skin sam-
ple from my little finger." This medical proce-
dure was not one that was carried out in the 
United Kingdom, according to extensive inves-
tigation of health policy records. After guided 
imagination, many subjects came to remember 
the non-existent procedure occurring in their 
childhood. Some embellished their reported 
memory with significant detail such as, "There 
was a nurse and the place smelled horrible." 
One of the cleverest and most powerful 
techniques for planting highly implausible 
false memories involves the use of fake photo-
graphs16. Subjects were shown a falsified pho-
tograph that was made up of a real photograph 
of the subject and a relative pasted into a proto-
type photograph of a hot-air balloon (FIG. 1). 
Family members confirmed that the event had 
never occurred. Subjects were shown the fake 
photograph and asked to tell "everything you 
can remember without leaving anything out, 
no matter how trivial it may seem." There were 
two further interviews, and by the end of the 
series 50% of the subjects had recalled, partially 
or clearly, the fictitious hot-air balloon ride. 
Some embellished their reports with sensory 
details of a hot-air balloon ride during child-
hood that had never occurred. For example, 
one subject said "I'm still pretty certain it 
occurred when I was in sixth grade at, urn, the 
local school there .. . I'm pretty certain that 
mum is down on the ground taking a photo."i6 
These studies, and many more like them, 
show that people can develop beliefs and 
memories for events that definitely did not 
happen to them. They can do this when fed 
strong suggestions — such as "your family 
told us about this event" or "look at this pho-
tograph of you from childhood". They can 
even do this when induced to imagine the 
experiences. Large changes in autobiography 
can be achieved quickly. Attempts to distin-
guish the false memories from true ones have 
occasionally shown statistical differences, such 
as differences in confidence, vividness or 
amount of detail17, or differences in lateralized 
brain potentials1819. For example, in the hot-
air balloon study16 the real memories were 
expressed with much more confidence than 
the fake ones. In most studies, any differences 
between true and false memories are observed 
only when comparing large groups of true 
and false memories, and these differences are 
typically too small to be useful for classifying a 
single autobiographical memory report as 
true or false. Psychological science has not yet 
developed a reliable way to classify memories 
as true or false. Moreover, it should be kept in 
mind that many false memories have been 
expressed with great confidence. 
Implications for society 
While researchers continue to investigate false 
memories, it is evident that there are already 
lessons to be learned. The fact that the memo-
ries of victims and witnesses can be false or 
inaccurate even though they believe them to 
be true has important implications for the 
legal system and for those who counsel or treat 
victims of crimes. 
Some psychotherapists use techniques that 
are suggestive (along the lines of, "you don't 
remember sexual abuse, but you have the 
symptoms, so let's just imagine who might 
have done it"). These can lead patients to false 
beliefs and memories, causing great damage to 
the patients themselves and to those who are 
accused. In one Illinois case, psychiatrist 
Bennett Braun was accused by his patient, 
Patricia Burgus. of using drugs and hypnosis 
to convince her that she possessed 300 person-
alities, ate meat loaf made of human flesh and 
was a high priestess in a satanic cult20. By some 
estimates, thousands of people have been 
harmed in similar ways by well-meaning 
providers who apply a 'cure' that ends up 
being worse than the disease21. Law enforce-
ment interrogations that are suggestive can 
lead witnesses to mistaken memories, even 
ones that are detailed and expressed with con-
fidence. Hundreds of people have been 
harmed by witnesses who made a mistake that 
could have been avoided22,23. Of course, even 
before the police arrive on the scene, witnesses 
talk to one another and cross contamination 
can occur. I personally witnessed this when I 
entered a shop in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
moments after a robbery had occurred and 
before the police arrived. In the immediate 
aftermath, customers and employees shared 
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Figure 1 | An example of a composite photograph of a hot-air balloon flight. The photograph on the 
left was used to create a misleading image (right) that could lead the subject to 'remember' a hot-air 
balloon flight as a child even when the experience had never occurred. Reproduced, with permission, from 
REF. 16 © (2002) Psychonomic Society. 
their recollections, providing fuel for influenc-
ing the thoughts of one another. This is why, 
during the Washington DC area sniper attacks 
in 2002, law enforcement officials advised 
members of the public who might witness the 
'next attack' to write down what they saw 
immediately, even using their hand if they did 
not have paper. Good advice, but I would sug-
gest having paper handy because the best 
course of action is to write down everything 
that can be remembered before witnesses are 
interrogated or talk to one another. This activ-
ity strengthens the memory and protects it to 
some extent from later contamination24. 
It is often argued that a few false accusations 
are just the cost of doing business. But this cost 
includes the potential for the actual perpetra-
tor to commit more crimes, and for the tax-
payer to have to pay sizable sums of money in 
compensation when wrongful convictions are 
exposed (which probably happens in only a 
fraction of cases). Although the defendants in 
most wrongful prosecution cases are govern-
ment officials or organizations, in one recent 
case the witness with mistaken memory was 
successfully sued25. Donna Parmeter, a former 
prison guard, was charged with kidnapping, 
robbery and torture. She had been identified 
by the victim, Peter Kretzu, who was tied up, 
blindfolded and tortured by two masked rob-
bers. Although the attackers wore ski masks, 
Kretzu claimed that he recognized Donna 
(from her voice and eyes) and her husband 
Joseph (from his breathing, laugh, body shape 
and 'chicken soup' body odour). Kretzu was 
100% certain. Donna was eventually exoner-
ated when investigators substantiated her alibi. 
But she had spent a month in jail, and she later 
sued, eventually winning a US$100,000 civil 
judgement against Kretzu. In the past, mistaken 
witnesses simply went their own ways, although 
there are a few known instances in which they 
have made profound apologies to those whom 
they had falsely accused. Will we now see more 
cases in which mistaken witnesses end up 
paying financially for their mistakes? 
Although much of the research has focused 
on wrongful convictions, there is another side 
to the criminal justice coin. Memory distor-
tions can also contribute to failures to convict 
a guilty person, not because an innocent per-
son is convicted in their place, but because 
accurate witness testimony can be under-
mined. If witnesses misremember some detail, 
or they are told that their stories conflict with 
other evidence, they might discount their tes-
timony and be less persuasive than perhaps 
they should be, or the jury might consider 
their entire testimony to be unreliable. 
Scientific research into memory has the 
potential to minimize these kinds of problem. 
Information from psychological scientists 
(and perhaps neuroscientists) could help to 
keep the people in power from making deci-
sions on the basis of myths or misconceptions 
about memory. Scientific knowledge could be 
shared with relevant individuals in many 
ways: through workshops for mental health 
professionals, training for police, seminars for 
lawyers and judges, judicial instructions or 
expert testimony for jurors. In one example, 
Jacob Beard of West Virginia was wrongly 
convicted of murdering two women and spent 
many years in prison. He managed to win a 
second trial. Expert testimony on suggestion 
and false memory was presented in that 
second trial, and helped to secure his acquittal. 
Beard later filed a civil lawsuit, and eventually 
received a settlement of nearly US$2 million in 
his case against state and county police26. 
This list of potential venues for education 
about the nature of memory represents just 
one proposal for a possible programme for 
action. Some legislative remedies might also 
be called for, especially in the most serious 
cases that can result in a sentence of death. 
Recently, the Innocence Protection Act was 
introduced in the United States Congress. It 
has two useful elements: access to DNA testing 
for convicted people and improvement in the 
quality of lawyers who try death penalty cases. 
Better lawyers might be better acquainted with 
the problems of memory and how to educate 
judges and jurors about these problems. 
Congress will be considering this legislation 
againin2003(REF.27). 
The American Judicature Society proposed 
the creation of an 'innocence commission' that 
would study why the legal system has failed in 
known cases of wrongful conviction. After all, 
look what the National Transportation Safety 
Board does when a plane crashes. Few expenses 
are spared as every aspect of the crash is exam-
ined. Not long ago, I proposed an analogous 
'National Memory Safety Board' that might 
concentrate specifically on memory problems 
that have led to injustice28. If the travesties of 
the past few decades were thoroughly exam-
ined side-by-side with scientific knowledge on 
memory, we would all benefit. It would be too 
late for the family of Steve Titus, who died of a 
heart attack at the age of 35 after being falsely 
convicted of rape. It would be too late for the 
many death row prisoners who have recently 
been exonerated by DNA evidence. It would be 
too late for the scores of innocent defendants 
who have had to face civil litigation over false 
claims of satanic ritual abuse and other dubi-
ous charges. But it might be in time to keep us 
from searching for that next white van that 
does not exist because someone inadvertently 
planted a false memory. 
To reiterate the main points: memory is 
more prone to error than many people real-
ize. Our memory system can be infused with 
compelling illusory memories of important 
events. These grand memory errors have con-
tributed to injustices that could have been 
avoided or minimized. As a start, I suggest 
that we all remember an important truth 
about the mind — paraphrasing Galeano: 
memory is born anew every day. 
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Creating False Memories 
Elizabeth F. Loftus 
In 1986 Nadean Cool, a nurse's aide in Wisconsin, sought therapy from a psychiatrist to help 
her cope with her reaction to a traumatic event experienced by her daughter. During therapy, 
the psychiatrist used hypnosis and other suggestive techniques to dig out buried memories of 
abuse that Cool herself had allegedly experienced. In the process, Cool became convinced that 
she had repressed memories of having been in a satanic cult, of eating babies, of being raped, 
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of having sex with animals and of being forced to watch the murder of her eight-year-old 
friend. She came to believe that she had more than 120 personalities-children, adults, angels 
and even a duck-all because, Cool was told, she had experienced severe childhood sexual and 
physical abuse. The psychiatrist also performed exorcisms on her, one of which lasted for five 
hours and included the sprinkling of holy water and screams for Satan to leave Cool's body. 
When Cool finally realized that false memories had been planted, she sued the psychiatrist for 
malpractice. In March 1997, after five weeks of trial, her case was settled out of court for $2.4 
million. Nadean Cool is not the only patient to develop false memories as a result of 
questionable therapy. In Missouri in 1992 a church counselor helped Beth Rutherford to 
remember during therapy that her father, a clergyman, had regularly raped her between the 
ages of seven and 14 and that her mother sometimes helped him by holding her down. Under 
her therapist's guidance, Rutherford developed memories of her father twice impregnating her 
and forcing her to abort the fetus herself with a coat hanger.The father had to resign from his 
post as a clergyman when the allegations were made public. Later medical examination of the 
daughter revealed, however, that she was still a virgin at age 22 and had never been pregnant. 
The daughter sued the therapist and received a $1-million settlement in 1996. 
About a year earlier two juries returned verdicts against a Minnesota psychiatrist accused of 
planting false memories by former patients Vynnette Hamanne and Elizabeth Carlson, who 
under hypnosis and sodium amytal, and after being fed misinformation about the workings of 
memory, had come to remember horrific abuse by family members. The juries awarded 
Hammane $2.67 million and Carlson $2.5 million for their ordeals. 
In all four cases, the women developed memories about childhood abuse in therapy and then 
later denied their authenticity. How can we determine if memories of childhood abuse are true 
or false? Without corroboration, it is very difficult to differentiate between false memories and 
true ones. Also, in these cases, some memories were contrary to physical evidence, such as 
explicit and detailed recollections of rape and abortion when medical examination confirmed 
virginity. How is it possible for people to acquire elaborate and confident false memories? A 
growing number of investigations demonstrate that under the right circumstances false 
memories can be instilled rather easily in some people. 
My own research into memory distortion goes back to the early 1970s, when I began studies of 
the "misinformation effect." These studies show that when people who witness an event are 
later exposed to new and misleading information about it, their recollections often become 
distorted. In one example, participants viewed a simulated automobile accident at an 
intersection with a stop sign. After the viewing, half the participants received a suggestion that 
the traffic sign was a yield sign. When asked later what traffic sign they remembered seeing at 
the intersection, those who had been given the suggestion tended to claim that they had seen a 
yield sign. Those who had not received the phony information were much more accurate in 
their recollection of the traffic sign. 
My students and I have now conducted more than 200 experiments involving over 20,000 
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individuals that document how exposure to misinformation induces memory distortion. In 
these studies, people "recalled" a conspicuous barn in a bucolic scene that contained no 
buildings at all, broken glass and tape recorders that were not in the scenes they viewed, a 
white instead of a blue vehicle in a crime scene, and Minnie Mouse when they actually saw 
Mickey Mouse. Taken together, these studies show that misinformation can change an 
individual's recollection in predictable and sometimes very powerful ways. 
Misinformation has the potential for invading our memories when we talk to other people, 
when we are suggestively interrogated or when we read or view media coverage about some 
event that we may have experienced ourselves. After more than two decades of exploring the 
power of misinformation, researchers have learned a great deal about the conditions that make 
people susceptible to memory modification. Memories are more easily modified, for instance, 
when the passage of time allows the original memory to fade. 
False Childhood Memories 
It is one thing to change a detail or two in an otherwise intact memory but quite another to 
plant a false memory of an event that never happened. To study false memory, my students and 
I first had to find a way to plant a pseudomemory that would not cause our subjects undue 
emotional stress, either in the process of creating the false memory or when we revealed that 
they had been intentionally deceived. Yet we wanted to try to plant a memory that would be at 
least mildly traumatic, had the experience actually happened. 
My research associate, Jacqueline E. Pickrell, and I settled on trying to plant a specific memory 
of being lost in a shopping mall or large department store at about the age of five. Here's how 
we did it. We asked our subjects, 24 individuals ranging in age from 18 to 53, to try to 
remember childhood events that had been recounted to us by a parent, an older sibling or 
another close relative. We prepared a booklet for each participant containing one-paragraph 
stories about three events that had actually happened to him or her and one that had not. We 
constructed the false event using information about a plausible shopping trip provided by a 
relative, who also verified that the participant had not in fact been lost at about the age of five. 
The lost-in-the-mall scenario included the following elements: lost for an extended period, 
crying, aid and comfort by an elderly woman and, finally, reunion with the family. 
After reading each story in the booklet, the 
participants wrote what they remembered about 
the event. If they did not remember it, they 
were instructed to write, "I do not remember 
this." In two follow-up interviews, we told the 
participants that we were interested in 
examining how much detail they could 
remember and how their memories compared 
with those of their relative. The event 
N i ! ' v . * , V ^ 
>m»v*v/i ^ -> * * ~**# %^#>%-^^ 
' H : I N ? ' 'I- > > , H : K 
Creating False Memories http://faculty.washington.edu/eloftus/Articles/sciam.htm 
^ 
M* !M" paragraphs were not read to them verbatim, but 
rather parts were provided as retrieval cues. 
The participants recalled something about 49 of 
the 72 true events (68 percent) immediately after the initial reading of the booklet and also in 
each of the two follow-up interviews. After reading the booklet, seven of the 24 participants 
(29 percent) remembered either partially or fully the false event constructed for them, and in 
the two follow-up interviews six participants (25 percent) continued to claim that they 
remembered the fictitious event. Statistically, there were some differences between the true 
memories and the false ones: participants used more words to describe the true memories, and 
they rated the true memories as being somewhat more clear. But if an onlooker were to observe 
many of our participants describe an event, it would be difficult indeed to tell whether the 
account was of a true or a false memory. Of course, being lost, however frightening, is not the 
same as being abused. But the lost-in-the-mall study is not about real experiences of being lost; 
it is about planting false memories of being lost. The paradigm shows a way of instilling false 
memories and takes a step toward allowing us to understand how this might happen in 
real-world settings. Moreover, the study provides evidence that people can be led to remember 
their past in different ways, and they can even be coaxed into "remembering" entire events that 
never happened. 
Studies in other laboratories using a similar experimental procedure have produced similar 
results. For instance, Ira Hyman, Troy H. Husband and F. James Billing of Western 
Washington University asked college students to recall childhood experiences that had been 
recounted by their parents. The researchers told the students that the study was about how 
people remember shared experiences differently. In addition to actual events reported by 
parents, each participant was given one false event either an overnight hospitalization for a 
high fever and a possible ear infection, or a birthday party with pizza and a clown that 
supposedly happened at about the age of five. The parents confirmed that neither of these 
events actually took place. 
Hyman found that students 
fully or partially recalled 84 
percent of the true events in 
v the first interview and 88 
percent in the second 
?4 interview. None of the 
§ | participants recalled the false 
event during the first 
* interview, but 20 percent said 
they remembered something 
about the false event in the 
£, second interview. One 
participant who had been 
exposed to the emergency 
hospitalization story later 
4 of 9 9/8/10 10:44 
"reating False Memories http.//faculty.washington.edu/eloftus/Articles/sc 
female nurse and a friend 
from church who came to 
visit at the hospital. In 
another study, along with true events Hyman presented different false events, such as 
accidentally spilling a bowl of punch on the parents of the bride at a wedding reception or 
having to evacuate a grocery store when the overhead sprinkler systems erroneously activated. 
Again, none of the participants recalled the false event during the first interview, but 18 percent 
remembered something about it in the second interview. For example, during the first 
interview, one participant, when asked about the fictitious wedding event, stated, "I have no 
clue. I have never heard that one before." In the second interview, the participant said, "It was 
an outdoor wedding, and I think we were running around and knocked something over like the 
punch bowl or something and made a big mess and of course got yelled at for it." 
Imagination Inflation 
The finding that an external suggestion can lead to the construction of false childhood 
memories helps us understand the process by which false memories arise. It is natural to 
wonder whether this research is applicable in real situations such as being interrogated by law 
officers or in psychotherapy. Although strong suggestion may not routinely occur in police 
questioning or therapy, suggestion in the form of an imagination exercise sometimes does. For 
instance, when trying to obtain a confession, law officers may ask a suspect to imagine having 
participated in a criminal act. Some mental health professionals encourage patients to imagine 
childhood events as a way of recovering supposedly hidden memories. 
Surveys of clinical 
ggg psychologists reveal that 11 
MM- percent instruct their clients to 
"let the imagination run wild," 
and 22 percent tell their clients 
**** to "give free rein to the 
imagination." Therapist Wendy 
Maltz, author of a popular book 
* on childhood sexual abuse, 
advocates telling the patient: 
"Spend time imaging that you 
were sexually abused, without 
worrying about accuracy 
proving anything, or having 
your ideas make sense .... Ask 
yourself... these questions: 
m What time of day is it? Where 
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What kind of things are 
happening? Is there one or 
more person with you?" Maltz 
further recommends that 
therapists continue to ask 
questions such as "Who would 
have been likely perpetrators? 
When were you most 
vulnerable to sexual abuse in 
your life?" 
The increasing use of such imagination exercises led me and several colleagues to wonder 
about their consequences. What happens when people imagine childhood experiences that did 
not happen to them? Does imagining a childhood event increase confidence that it occurred? 
To explore this, we designed a three-stage procedure. We first asked individuals to indicate the 
likelihood that certain events happened to them during their childhood. The list contains 40 
events, each rated on a scale ranging from "definitely did not happen" to "definitely did 
happen." Two weeks later we asked the participants to imagine that they had experienced some 
of these events. Different subjects were asked to imagine different events. Sometime later the 
participants again were asked to respond to the original list of 40 childhood events, indicating 
how likely it was that these events actually happened to them. Consider one of the imagination 
exercises. Participants are told to imagine playing inside at home after school, hearing a 
strange noise outside, running toward the window, tripping, falling, reaching out and breaking 
the window with their hand. In addition, we asked participants questions such as "What did 
you trip on? How did you feel?" In one study 24 percent of the participants who imagined the 
broken-window scenario later reported an increase in confidence that the event had occurred, 
whereas only 12 percent of those who were not asked to imagine the incident reported an 
increase in the likelihood that it had taken place. We found this "imagination inflation" effect in 
each of the eight events that participants were asked to imagine. A number of possible 
explanations come to mind. An obvious one is that an act of imagination simply makes the 
event seem more familiar and that familiarity is mistakenly related to childhood memories 
rather than to the act of imagination. Such source confusion when a person does not remember 
the source of information can be especially acute for the distant experiences of childhood. 
Studies by Lyn Giff and Henry L. Roediger III of Washington University of recent rather than 
childhood experiences more directly connect imagined actions to the construction of false 
memory. During the initial session, the researchers instructed participants to perform the stated 
action, imagine doing it or just listen to the statement and do nothing else. The actions were 
simple ones: knock on the table, lift the stapler, break the toothpick, cross your fingers, roll 
your eyes. During the second session, the participants were asked to imagine some of the 
actions that they had not previously performed. During the final session, they answered 
questions about what actions they actually performed during the initial session. The 
investigators found that the more times participants imagined an unperformed action, the more 
likely they were to remember having performed it. 
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Impossible Memories 
It is highly unlikely that an adult can recall genuine episodic memories from the first year of 
life, in part because the hippocampus, which plays a key role in the creation of memories, has 
not matured enough to form and store longlasting memories that can be retrieved in adulthood. 
* 
A procedure for planting "impossible" 
memories about experiences that occur shortly 
after birth has been developed by the late 
Nicholas Spanos and his collaborators at 
Carleton University. Individuals are led to 
believe that they have well-coordinated eye 
i movements and visual exploration skills 
probably because they were born in hospitals 
: that hung swinging, colored mobiles over infant 
jcribs. To confirm whether they had such an 
experience, half the participants are hypnotized, 
age-regressed to the day after birth and asked 
I what they remembered. The other half of the 
I group participates in a "guided mnemonic 
Irestructuring" procedure that uses age 
I regression as well as active encouragement to 
• re-create the infant experiences by imagining 
them.. Spanos and his co-workers found that the vast majority of their subjects were 
susceptible to these memory-planting procedures. Both the hypnotic and guided participants 
reported infant memories. Surprisingly, the guided group did so somewhat more (95 versus 70 
percent). Both groups remembered the colored mobile at a relatively high rate (56 percent of 
the guided group and 46 percent of the hypnotic subjects). Many participants who did not 
remember the mobile did recall other things, such as doctors, nurses, bright lights, cribs and 
masks. Also, in both groups, of those who reported memories of infancy, 49 percent felt that 
they were real memories, as opposed to 16 percent who claimed that they were merely 
fantasies. These findings confirm earlier studies that many individuals can be led to construct 
complex, vivid and detailed false memories via a rather simple procedure. Hypnosis clearly is 
not necessary. 
How False Memories Form 
In the lost-in-the-mall study, implantation of false memory occurred when another person, 
usually a family member, claimed that the incident happened. Corroboration of an event by 
another person can be a powerful technique for instilling a false memory. In fact, merely 
claiming to have seen a person do something can lead that person to make a false confession of 
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wrongdoing. 
This effect was demonstrated in a study by Saul M. Kassin and his colleagues at Williams 
College, who investigated the reactions of individuals falsely accused of damaging a computer 
by pressing the wrong key. The innocent participants initially denied the charge, but when a 
confederate said that she had seen them perform the action, many participants signed a 
confession, internalized guilt for the act and went on to confabulate details that were consistent 
with that belief. These findings show that false incriminating evidence can induce people to 
accept guilt for a crime they did not commit and even to develop memories to support their 
guilty feelings. 
Research is beginning to give us an understanding of how false memories of complete, 
emotional and self-participatory experiences are created in adults. First, there are social 
demands on individuals to remember; for instance, researchers exert some pressure on 
participants in a study to come up with memories. Second, memory construction by imagining 
events can be explicitly encouraged when people are having trouble remembering. And, finally, 
individuals can be encouraged not to think about whether their constructions are real or not. 
Creation of false memories is most likely to occur when these external factors are present, 
whether in an experimental setting, in a therapeutic setting or during everyday activities. 
False memories are constructed by combining actual memories with the content of suggestions 
received from others. During the process, individuals may forget the source of the information. 
This is a classic example of source confusion, in which the content and the source become 
dissociated. 
Of course, because we can implant false childhood memories in some individuals in no way 
implies that all memories that arise after suggestion are necessarily false. Put another way, 
although experimental work on the creation of false memories may raise doubt about the 
validity of long-buried memories, such as repeated trauma, it in no way disproves them. 
Without corroboration, there is little that can be done to help even the most experienced 
evaluator to differentiate true memories from ones that were suggestively planted. 
The precise mechanisms by which such false memories are constructed await further research. 
We still have much to learn about the degree of confidence and the characteristics of false 
memories created in these ways, and we need to discover what types of individuals are 
particularly susceptible to these forms of suggestion and who is resistant. 
As we continue this work, it is important to heed the cautionary tale in the data we have 
already obtained: mental health professionals and others must be aware of how greatly they 
can influence the recollection of events and of the urgent need for maintaining restraint in 
situations in which imagination is used as an aid in recovering presumably lost memories. 
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throughout psychology. Her other important work focused 
on the organization of semantic memory, the effects of 
imagination on illusory memories, and the role of landmark 
events in organizing autobiographical memory. She is a 
foremost spokesperson for psychology and is a frequent 
lecturer in public forums. Her work has provided fascinat-
ing applications of psychological science to the legal sys-
tem and to contemporary societal issues." 
Biography 
For more than 30 years, Elizabeth F. Loftus has been ob-
sessed with one topic: memory. Her obsession began about 
the time that Richard Nixon was elected President of the 
United States and a couple of Americans walked on the 
moon for the first time. It was then that she began to think 
of herself as a research psychologist. She discovered that 
she had a talent: She could design experiments, complete 
them, analyze the data, and publish the findings in scien-
tific journals. Some of that undergraduate education at the 
University of California, Los Angeles (where she majored 
in mathematics and psychology), and that graduate educa-
tion at Stanford (where she received her doctorate in psy-
chology) had truly sunk in. It was an exciting realization: 
She not only could read about real psychological scientists 
but could actually be one. 
Today, Elizabeth Loftus is distinguished professor at the 
University of California, Irvine. She holds positions in the 
Departments of Psychology and Social Behavior and Crimi-
nology, Law and Society. She also holds appointments in the 
Department of Cognitive Sciences and the Center for the Neu-
robiology of Learning and Memory. Formerly, she was pro-
fessor of psychology and adjunct professor of law7 at the Uni-
versity of Washington, Seattle, where she taught for 29 years. 
Loftus's early studies were about semantic memory-
memory for language, concepts, and general knowledge of 
the world. Soon she wanted to study some aspect of mem-
ory that had more obvious real-world applications. The 
perfect place for someone with a background in memory 
and an interest in legal issues was the study of witnesses to 
legally relevant events, such as crimes and accidents. Her 
earliest studies of eyewitness testimony addressed several 
issues: When someone sees a crime or accident, how accu-
rate is his or her memory? What happens when witnesses 
are questioned by police officers, and what if those ques-
tions are biased? While other memory researchers were 
using words or nonsense syllables, or sometimes sentences, 
Loftus began showing people films of traffic accidents. She 
found that a question such as "How fast were the cars go-
ing when they smashed into each other?" led to higher esti-
mates of speed than a more neutral question that used the 
verb hit. Moreover, the "smashed" question led more peo-
ple to later falsely claim that they had seen broken glass when 
there was none. Her early papers concluded that leading ques-
tions could contaminate or distort a witness's memory. 
The laboratory studies were exciting, but she soon wanted 
to see actual witnesses to real events up close and personal. 
She volunteered to help a public defender in a murder case. In 
exchange for him letting her watch the various phases of the 
case involving the witness testimony, she would educate him 
about the findings of psychological science that might be rele-
vant to his case. His client was a woman who had gotten into 
a violent argument with her boyfriend. Hie client shot the 
boyfriend six times and was tried for murder. Psychological 
studies helped the lawyer understand the conflicting eyewit-
ness testimony, and the defendant was ultimately acquitted. 
Loftus wrote an article about the research and the specifics of 
the case for Psychology Today magazine. After that, her life 
would never be the same. The circulation of the magazine 
was near a million and was read by many lawyers and judges. 
The phone starting ringing off the hook. Lawyers wondered if 
Loftus could help on their cases. Legal-conference organizers 
wondered if she could lecture on this subject at their continu-
ing education meetings. And the next few decades of her life 
would be filled with scientific discoveries and legal cases, 
intermixed and interwoven, so that the issues in a legal case 
might suggest a study and a study might enter into a legal case. 
Loftus's research has focused on eyewitness testimony, 
and she has published extensively on both its psychological 
and legal aspects. She has also investigated the issue of the 
accuracy of memories formed in childhood and the possi-
bility of recovery later in life of memories of traumatic 
events that had apparently been repressed. She has devoted 
much research effort to the possibility that recovered mem-
ories may be false —false memories that in some cases are 
due to therapeutic treatments designed to help patients 
dredge up memory. She has done scores of studies that 
show not only that memories can be distorted by sugges-
tive influences but also that entirely false memories can be 
planted in people's minds. She has succeeded in planting 
false memories of getting lost for an extended time as a 
child, facing a threat to one's life as a child, witnessing 
demonic possession as a child, seeing wounded animals as 
part of a traumatic bombing, and more. 
Because of this research, Loftus has been invited to 
consult (and sometimes to testify as an expert witness) in 
hundreds of cases, including the McMartin Preschool Mo-
lestation case, the Hillside Strangler case, the Abscam 
cases, the trial of Oliver North, the trial of the officers ac-
cused in the Rodney King beating, the Mcnendez brothers, 
the Michael Jackson case, the Bosnian War trials in the 
Hague, the Oklahoma City bombing case, and the trial of 
the Marines accused of culpable negligence when they sev-
ered the cables of a ski lift while flying in the Italian Alps. 
Loftus also worked on cases involving allegations of re-
pressed memories, such as those involving George Franklin 
of San Mateo, California; Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago; 
Gary Ramona of Napa, California; and Jacob Beard, ac-
cused of the "Rainbow Murders" in West Virginia. The 
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research also has given her opportunities to consult with 
many government agencies on problems of human mem-
ory, including the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Internal 
Revenue Sendee, and the Department of Justice. 
Loftus has received four honorary doctorates for her re-
search, the first in 1982 from Miami University (Ohio), the 
second in 1990 from Leiden University in the Netherlands, 
and the third in 1994 from the John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice in New York—an honorary doctorate of laws. Her 
fourth honorary doctorate, from the University of Portsmouth 
in England, was awarded in 1998. She served as the 1984 
president of the Western Psychological Association and was 
elected again in 2003. She was the 1985 president of the 
American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the 
American Psychological Association [APA]), the 1988 presi-
dent of Division 3 (Experimental) of the APA, and the 1998— 
1999 president of the American Psychological Society. 
For her research, Loftus has received some of the most 
prestigious awards that the field of psychology has to offer 
its members. In 1995, she received an award from the 
American Academy of Forensic Psychology—their Distin-
guished Contributions to Forensic Psychology Award. In 
1996, she received the American Association of Applied 
and Preventive Psychology Award for Distinguished Con-
tribution to Basic and Applied Scientific Psychology. In 
1997, she received the American Psychological Society 
James McKeen Cattell Fellow ("for a career of significant 
intellectual contributions to the science of psychology in 
the area of applied psychological research"). She received 
the William James Fellow Award from the American Psy-
chological Society in 2001 (for "'ingeniously and rigorously 
designed research studies . . . that yielded clear objective 
evidence on difficult and controversial questions"). That 
same year, the National Academy of Sciences bestowed on 
her the inaugural Henry and Bryna David Lectureship (an 
award for "application of the best social and behavioral 
sciences research to public policy issues"). The article that 
she wrote in conjunction with this award was subsequently 
selected for inclusion in The Best American Science and 
Nature Writing. In 2003, the same year that she received 
the APA Award for Distinguished Scientific Applications 
of Psychology, she was also elected to membership of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences. 
Perhaps one of the most unusual signs of recognition of 
the impact of Loftus's research came in a study published 
by the Review of General Psychology*. There Loftus was 
named one of the top 100 most eminent psychologists of 
the 20th century and was the top-ranked woman on the list. 
Freud, Skinner, and Piaget are at the top of that list. She 
sometimes wonders how long it will take for a woman to 
achieve one of those very top spots. She is taking bets on 
this at the moment and hopes that it comes relatively soon 
after the election of the first female President of the United 
States. A future winner of this APA award could then 
place the start of her career in that historical moment. 
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Elizabeth R Loftus 
University of California, Irvine 
Research on memoiy distortion has shown that postevent 
suggestion can contaminate what a person remembers. 
Moreover, suggestion can lead to false memories being 
injected outright into the minds of people. These findings have 
Editor's Note 
Elizabeth F. Loftus received the Award for Distinguished 
Scientific Applications of Psychology. Award winners are 
invited to deliver an award address at the APA 's annual 
convention. A version of this award address was delivered 
at the 111th annual meeting, held August 7-10, 2003, in 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Articles based on award ad-
dresses are reviewed, but they differ from unsolicited arti-
cles in that they are expressions of the winners' reflections 
on their work and their views of the field. 
implications for police investigation, clinical practice, and 
other settings in which memory reports are solicited. 
In the spring of 2003, Alan Alda visited the University of 
California, Irvine (UC Irvine), to film segments for an up-
coming series as part of his Scientific American Frontiers 
program. Many know him from his role as Hawkeye Pierce 
in the classic TV series M*A *S*K Alda wrote and di-
rected many of the M*A*S*H episodes, and during his 11 
years with the show, he won the Emmy Award five times. 
What you may not realize that he is a lifelong science buff 
and loves hosting Scientific American Frontiers in part be-
cause he gets to travel the globe in the name of science 
and in part because he gets the chance to meet scientists 
everywhere. On this particular day in April, Alan Alda vis-
ited a number of memoiy scientists at UC Irvine, and we 
all had a chance to demonstrate our research paradigms. 
A week earlier, Alan had filled out some questionnaires 
ostensibly designed to gather information about his life-
long history with foods and his personality. He thought my 
students and I were interested in the relationship between 
eating behavior and personality. Once in the lab, we tried 
to convince him that when he was a child he had gotten 
sick eating too many hard-boiled eggs. We explained that a 
sophisticated computer program had analyzed all of his 
data and discovered several facts to be true about him, in-
cluding the "gotten sick" fact. An hour or so later, he had 
a picnic in the park with students, postdocs, and other 
members of my lab. There were many foods from which to 
choose: sandwiches, pickles, shrimp cocktail, hard-boiled 
eggs, deviled eggs, and more. He refused to eat the eggs. 
Alan Alda's reluctance to eat a hard-boiled egg at that 
particular picnic could be due to many causes, of course. 
But his avoidance on that day was filmed and, through Sci-
entific American Frontiers, will be shown to millions. 
When this happens, it will constitute a unique opportunity 
to illustrate some new discoveries about human memory. I 
will get to these later, but first some background. 
Eyewitness Memory 
For more than three decades, I have been studying memory 
and the ways it can go awry. My first studies of eyewitness 
testimony addressed several key questions: When someone 
sees a crime or accident, how accurate is his or her mem-
ory? What happens when this person is questioned by po-
lice officers, and what if those questions are leading in 
some way? While others in the field of memory were 
studying memory for words or nonsense syllables, or 
sometimes sentences, I began showing people films of traf-
fic accidents and questioning them in various ways. The 
question "Did you see the broken headlight?" led to more 
false reports of a broken headlight than the same question 
asked with the verb hit. "How fast were the cars going 
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when they smashed into each other?" led to higher esti-
mates of speed than a more neutral question that used the 
verb hit. Moreover, the "smashed" question led more peo-
ple to later falsely claim that they had seen broken glass 
when there was none. My early papers concluded that lead-
ing questions could contaminate or distort a witness's 
memory (see Loftus, 1979/1996, for a summary of this 
early research). 
In fact, leading questions are only one way to distort 
memory. Related studies showed that memory could be-
come skewed with various techniques that fed misinforma-
tion to unsuspecting individuals. The studies used a simple 
procedure. Participants first see a complex event, such as a 
simulated automobile accident. Next, half of the partici-
pants receive misleading information about the accident, 
whereas the other half receive no misinformation. Finally, 
all of the participants try to remember the original acci-
dent. In one actual study using this paradigm, participants 
saw an accident, and later some of them received misinfor-
mation about the traffic sign used to control the intersec-
tion. The misled participants got the false suggestion that 
the stop sign that they had actually seen was a yield sign. 
When asked later what kind of traffic sign they personally 
remembered seeing at the intersection, those who had been 
given the false suggestion tended to adopt it as their mem-
ory and now claimed that they had seen a yield sign. 
Those who had not received the phony information had 
much more accurate memories. 
Today, hundreds of studies have been published docu-
menting memory distortion induced by exposure to misin-
formation. In these studies, not only have people recalled 
stop signs as yield signs but they have also recalled nonex-
istent broken glass and tape recorders, a blue vehicle used 
in a crime scene as white, Minnie Mouse when they really 
saw Mickey Mouse, and, most recently, wounded animals 
(that were not there) near the scene of a tragic terrorist 
bombing that actually had occurred in Russia a few years 
earlier (Nourkova, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2003). Taken to-
gether, these studies show that misinformation can change 
an individual's recollection in predictable, and sometimes 
very powerful ways. 
Misinformation can influence people's memories when 
they are interrogated in a suggestive fashion or when they 
talk to other people who give their version of the events. 
Misinformation can sway people when they see biased me-
dia coverage about some event that they may have experi-
enced themselves. This phenomenon would ultimately be 
called the misinformation effect (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). 
It might be tempting to suggest that memory distortion 
observed in the safety and pallid world of a laboratory set-
ting would not generalize to the outside world or real 
events (as Yuille & Cutshall, 1986, have suggested). In-
deed there are differences in the active/passive role, in the 
opportunity to obsene, in the degree of emotional arousal, 
and more. To explore this issue, a Norwegian research 
group recently exposed participants to a "live" crime and 
compared their memory performance with those who 
watched a video of the same crime (Ihlebaek, Love, Eilert-
sen, & Magnussen, 2003). The "live" group were partici-
pants in a course designed to teach them to cope with dan-
gerous and violent armed-robbery situations and to cope 
with the psychological effects of experiencing such trau-
mas. Robberies were staged, and participants experienced 
them live. Videotapes of those same robberies were shown 
to comparable participants. The results showed that partici-
pants who watched the videos reported more details and 
with higher accuracy than those who saw the live events, 
suggesting that laboratory experiments may actually over-
estimate memory performance. 
After more than two decades exploring the misinforma-
tion effect, many psychological scientists have contributed 
to the knowledge, and collectively we have learned a great 
deal about the conditions of its power. One group showed 
that postevent information can even affect the memories of 
three-month-old infants (Rovee-Collier, Borza, Adler, & 
Boiler, 1993). Another group showed that one can even get 
the misinformation effect with pigeons (Harper & Garry, 
2000). Fortunately, we have also learned that warning peo-
ple about misinformation effects can sometimes enable 
them to successfully resist those effects (Highhouse & Bot-
trill 1995). Many highly sophisticated models have been 
developed that specify when memory impairments will and 
will not be expected (Metcalfe, 1990). 
The misinformation research tradition continues today. 
For example, one group showed that people who thought 
they were drinking alcohol, but actually drank plain tonic 
water, were more swayed by misinformation than those 
who were not under the influence of an alcohol placebo 
(Assefi & Garry, 2002). Another research group recently 
examined the relative suggestive power of misinformation 
versus hypnosis (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Milling, 
2002). Participants heard a story and were later asked ei-
ther neutral or misleading questions, either in or out of 
hypnosis. When tested later, the use of hypnosis increased 
memory errors, but the misleading questions produced even 
more errors. Moreover, the combination of the two (hypno-
sis and misleading questions) produced more errors than 
either method by itself. The particular kind of error made 
by those who were asked misleading questions was to shift 
from reporting not knowing an answer to questions to re-
porting false information about the past. From this exam-
ple, it becomes evident that researchers are learning a great 
deal about the precise way in which misinformation has 
immediate and persisting deleterious effects on memory. 
That misleading questions might have more pernicious ef-
fects than prior exposure to hypnosis led Scoboria et al. 
(2002) to question existing legal practices concerning the 
868 November 2003 • American Psychologist 
circumstances under which witness testimony is admitted 
or excluded in court cases. 
Rich False Memories 
Planting False Memories 
It is one thing to change a stop sign into a yield sign, to 
turn Mickey into Minnie, or to add a detail to a memory 
report for something that actually did happen. But could 
one create an entire memory for an event that never hap-
pened? My first attempt to do this used a procedure 
whereby participants were given short narrative descrip-
tions of childhood events and encouraged to try to remem-
ber those events. While participants believed that all of the 
descriptions were true and had been provided by family 
members, one was actually a pseudoevent that had not oc-
curred. In this study, approximately 25% of participants 
were led to believe, wholly or partially, that at age 5 or 6 
they had been lost in a shopping mall for an extended 
time, were highly upset, and were ultimately rescued by an 
elderly person and reunited with their family (Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995). Many added embellishing details to their 
accounts. 
The method of using family members to help plant false 
memories has been dubbed the familial informant false-
narrative procedure (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & 
Garry, in press), but it is probably easier to call it simply 
the lost-in-the-mall technique. Many investigators have 
used the lost-in-the-mall technique to plant false memories 
of events that would have been far more unusual, bizarre, 
painful, or even traumatic had they actually occurred. Par-
ticipants have been led to believe that they had been hospi-
talized overnight or that they had an accident at a family 
wedding (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Hyman & 
Pentland, 1996). They have been convinced that they had 
nearly drowned and had to be rescued by a lifeguard 
(Heaps & Nash, 2001). They have fallen sway to the sug-
gestion that they were once the victims of a vicious animal 
attack (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). Most studies find 
that a significant minority of participants will develop par-
tial or complete false memories. In a set of studies re-
viewed by Lindsay et al. (in press), the average false-
memory rate was 31%, but in individual studies, of course, 
the figures can vary. Sometimes people have been resistant 
to suggestions, as they were when investigators tried to 
plant false memories of having received a rectal enema 
(Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). Conversely, sometimes 
false memories have been planted in the minds of more 
than 50% of exposed individuals, as they were when inves-
tigators tried to plant false memories of having gone up in 
a hot-air balloon ride (Wade, Garry., Read, & Lindsay, 
2002). Particularly striking are the complete false memo-
ries, or what might be termed rich false memories, which 
are experiences about which a person can feel confident, 
provide details, even express emotion about made-up 
events that never happened (Loftus & Bernstein, in press). 
One interpretative issue that recurs in this memory distor-
tion research is whether we are truly planting a false mem-
ory. Perhaps the suggestive manipulation is leading people 
to discover a true memory rather than leading them to em-
brace a false one. To investigate this issue, researchers 
have adopted several methods, including one that attempts 
to create a false memory for a recent event (e.g., "What 
you did on a particular day?"). If you as a researcher know 
precisely what happened that day and you lead the partici-
pant to "remember" doing something else, you have fairly 
good evidence that you have created a false report. This 
strategy was first adopted by Gotland Roediger (1998) and 
later modified by my colleague and me (Thomas & Loftus, 
2002). In one study, participants sat in front of a large ta-
ble filled with numerous objects. They heard a series of 
statements (e.g., "flip the coin") and then had to perform or 
imagine performing the called-for actions. The next time 
they came to the lab, there were no objects in front of 
them, but they simply imagined that they performed vari-
ous actions. In a final session, their memory for what they 
did that first day was tested. After a few imaginations, par-
ticipants occasionally remembered performing actions that 
they had not performed. They falsely claimed that they did 
things that would have been common (e.g., roll the dice), 
but they also claimed that they did things that would have 
been rather bizarre or unusual, such as "rub the chalk on 
your head" or "kiss a plastic frog" (Thomas, Bulevich, & 
Loftus, in press; Thomas & Loftus, 2002). 
Imagination can not only make people believe they have 
done simple things that they have not done but can also 
lead people to believe that they have experienced more 
complex events. In one study, participants watched a video 
clip of a drunk-driving incident. Later, some participants 
imagined a scene that was not part of the presented sce-
nario. They imagined seeing a policeman stop the car and 
ask the driver to step out but the driver refuse. Later, 15% 
of "imagine" participants mentioned seeing the false details 
when tested with free recall, and an astonishing 41% claimed 
to have seen these false details when tested with recogni-
tion-type memory items (Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). 
Another method for assessing whether the suggestive 
manipulations are planting false memories is to try to plant 
memories for things that would be implausible or even im-
possible. For instance, it has been possible to plant beliefs 
or false memories of witnessing demonic possession as a 
child (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). And it has been 
even easier to plant a false memory of meeting Bugs 
Bunny at a Disney Resort (Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002). 
The latter was accomplished by presenting participants 
with fake ads for Disney that featured Bugs Bunny. 
In one study, exposure to the fake ad led 16% of partic-
ipants to later claim that they had personally met Bugs at 
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Disneyland. This could not have occurred because Bugs 
Bunny is a Warner Brothers character and would not be 
found at Disneyland. This impossibility was far more col-
orfully put by Andrew Malcolm in his unsigned (voice of 
the paper) editorial in the Los Angeles Times: "the wascally 
Warner Bros. Wabbit would be awwested on sight" at Dis-
ney ("You Must Remember This," 2003, p. 10). Follow-up 
studies showed that even more individuals (25% in one 
study; 36% in another) fell sway to the suggestion about 
meeting Bugs after multiple exposures to fake ads featuring 
Bugs Bunny (Grinley, 2002). What do people remember 
about their encounter with this character whom they could 
not have met? Of those recalling a personal encounter with 
Bugs, 62% said they shook his hand, and 46% remembered 
hugging him. Others remembered touching his ear or tail, 
or even hearing him speak ("What's up, Doc?1'). These 
false memories, thus, were imbued with sensory detail, just 
the kind of sensory detail that people use as a cue to de-
cide whether a memory is true or false. 
Alan Alda looked at our fake ads for Disney. He closely 
examined the one featuring Bugs and compared it with our 
generic ad for Disney that did not mention the cartoon 
character. He explained that he preferred the generic ad, 
mostly because of its colors. Later, while picnicking in the 
park, he was asked about his own childhood trip to Disney 
and which characters he met there. When asked specifically 
about Bugs Bunny, he said, "No way, he's a Warner 
Brothers character." Thus, he resisted the suggestion in the 
fake ad, as did most of our real experimental participants. 
But, as I explain later, his resistance did not appear to be 
operating when it came to the hard-boiled egg. 
False Memories Matter 
True memories seem to have consequences for people. If 
you remember that someone insulted you in the past, you 
might avoid encounters with that unpleasant individual in 
the future. But what if you had a false memory of being 
insulted? Would you similarly avoid that person later? It 
seems like this would be the case, but virtually all of the 
false-memory research stops when the affected individual 
accepts the scenario. Occasionally, there have been efforts 
to find out if the person has merely a belief that the event 
happened with no accompanying feelings of recollection. 
Sometimes that is all there is to the experience, simply a 
false belief. But sometimes the person has the subjective 
sense of recollection, replete with sensory details. It is this 
experience that is more akin to what has been called a rich 
false memory. In the typical study, debriefing of partici-
pants occurs after probing for a memory report, and the 
study is soon over. Now, what if debriefing could be de-
layed so that one could see whether the false memory af-
fects the thoughts or behaviors of the person down the 
road? One might then be able to show that false memories 
have consequences, that they do matter. 
Another way to think about this issue is to realize that 
suggestions can render an individual willing to make a 
new, possibly false memory report. This has been amply 
demonstrated. But are there memory con-elates? Are there 
other mental processes or behaviors that also are affected 
in the process of exposure to suggestive influences? If so, 
one might be seeing an even deeper effect of those 
influences. 
This was the rationale behind one study designed to see 
if planting the suggestion about meeting Bugs Bunny at 
Disney would affect the recipient's thought processes 
(Grinley, 2002). In this study, participants were first con-
vinced that they had met Bugs Bunny at a Disney resort. 
Later, they were given a new test: They saw the names of 
pairs of cartoon characters, such as Mickey Mouse and 
Donald Duck, and had to indicate how related the charac-
ters were to one another. Some pairs were highly related, 
like Mickey and Minnie Mouse. Some pairs were not par-
ticularly related, like Donald Duck and Sleeping Beauty. 
After being exposed to the fake Disney ads featuring Bugs 
Bunny, people rated the pair Mickey Mouse and Bugs 
Bunny to be more closely related. For a time, then, the 
thought processes or semantic structures of ad-exposed in-
dividuals were influenced. 
A further investigation of the consequences of false be-
liefs or memories involves a recent ongoing collaboration 
with postdoctoral fellow Daniel Bernstein and two graduate 
students, Cara Laney and Erin Morris. We induced partici-
pants to believe that when they were children they got sick 
eating hard-boiled eggs (or, for other participants, that they 
got sick eating dill pickles). We accomplished this mental 
feat by gathering data from the participants and plying 
them with false feedback. We told them that a sophisti-
cated computer program had analyzed their data and deter-
mined that they had had one of these "sick" experiences as 
a child. We found that those given the "dill pickle" feed-
back became more confident that they had had the experi-
ence as a child and those given the "hard-boiled egg" feed-
back became more confident of that experience. 
But would the increase in belief translate into subse-
quent behavior change? Would they, for example, avoid 
these foods when given the opportunity to eat them? To 
find out, we gave participants a "Party Behavior" question-
naire. They imagined themselves at a large barbeque and 
had to indicate which foods they would like to eat. Those 
who were seduced by the dill pickle feedback reported be-
ing less likely to want to eat pickles, whereas those who 
fell for the egg feedback reported being less likely to want 
to eat eggs. 
When we demonstrated our methodology for Alan Alda 
during his visit to UC Irvine, he showed increased confi-
dence that he had gotten sick eating hard-boiled eggs as a 
child. When later offered hard-boiled eggs and deviled 
eggs at a picnic in the park, Alda declined to eat them. Our 
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findings in the "food" study constitute the beginning of a 
method for studying false memories and their conse-
quences. But they also hint, at unexpected applications: 
what a potentially easy way to make people avoid certain 
foods. 
In The Tragedy of King Richard the Second, Shake-
speare asked a simple question: "Who can . . . cloy the 
hungry edge of appetite by bare imagination of a feast?" 
We cannot do this, he suggested, any more than we can 
easily walk "naked in December snow by thinking on fan-
tastic summer's heat." Thinking about the good, Shake-
speare noted, makes us feel worse. Our results would give 
Shakespeare food for thought (excuse the pun). It is not a 
feast that one should imagine but getting sick on that feast. 
More generally, our results are showing that changing a 
belief or memory can have important consequences for 
subsequent thoughts or behaviors. When you change mem-
ory, it changes you. 
True Versus False Memories 
In the ideal world, people would have a means of distin-
guishing true and false memories. Statistically, one occa-
sionally can do this. In an effort to plant false memories of 
being lost in a shopping mall, we showed that true memo-
ries were held with more confidence than the false ones 
(Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Other researchers have also 
found group differences. Wade et al. (2002), who planted 
false memories of taking a hot-air balloon ride as a child 
by showing participants doctored photographs, also showed 
that the true events they asked about were recalled with 
greater confidence than the false one. Porter et al. (1999), 
who planted false memories of being victimized by a seri-
ous animal attack as a child, found that the planted memo-
ries were rated as less coherent than real memories. 
There have also been promising efforts to use neuro-
physiological measures to distinguish true and false memo-
ries. Some differences have been reported using human 
lateralized brain potentials (Fabiana, Stadler, & Wessels, 
2000), using the P300 component of event-related poten-
tials (Miller, Baratta, Wynveen, & Rosenfeld, 2000), and 
using neuroimaging techniques (Schacter, Buckner, Kout-
staal, Dale, & Rosen, 1997). By necessity, these studies 
have been done with true and false memories of words 
heard in a word list rather than with the eyewitness details 
or rich false memories. While promising, these preliminary 
efforts are still a long way from allowing researchers to 
take one individual memory and reliably classify it as be-
ing true or false. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Collectively, researchers have learned a great deal about 
how false memories develop and are almost at the point of 
being able to write a recipe. First, the individual gets con-
vinced that the false event is plausible. Even events that 
start out being rather implausible can be made to seem 
more plausible by simple suggestion. Next, the individual 
gets convinced that the false event was personally experi-
enced. Plying the person with false feedback is a particu-
larly effective way to accomplish this. At this point, the 
individual might merely believe that the event is true but 
have no sense of recollection. But with guided imagination, 
with visualization of the stories of others, and with sugges-
tive feedback and other sorts of manipulations, a rich false 
memory can develop. 
The research on false beliefs and memories has enor-
mous relevance to eveiyday life. Analyses of the growing 
number of wrongful convictions, proven wrong by DNA 
evidence, have taught us that faulty eyewitness memory is 
the major cause (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness 
Evidence, 1999). This revelation has led to numerous rec-
ommendations for the legal system to protect the fact-find-
ing process from the tragedies of mistaken memory, both 
in the United States and Canada (Yarmey, 2003). Analyses 
of the hundreds of case in which patients were led to be-
lieve falsely that they were molested for years in satanic 
rituals or that they were abducted by aliens and taken up in 
spaceships have taught us that suggestion is a key factor 
leading to these beliefs (McNally, 2003). Moreover, once 
they take hold, these ''memories" can be expressed with 
great confidence, detail, and emotion. In one study, individ-
uals who believed they had been abducted by aliens were 
as emotionally aroused by thinking of their terrifying ab-
ductions as they were about other stressful experiences, or 
as "nonabducted" individuals were when they recalled per-
sonal traumas (McNally, 2003). Two take-home lessons 
flow from this research: (a) Suggestion can lead to rich 
false memories, and (b) just because a memory report is 
expressed with confidence, detail, and emotion does not 
necessarily mean the underlying event actually happened. 
McNally (2003) expressed his faith in the value of cogni-
tive psychology to help resolve some of the controversies 
in this area. It is with the methods of cognitive psychol-
ogy, he argued, that scientists will be able to test their hy-
potheses not only about how people may forget traumatic 
events but also about how people "come to believe they 
have been traumatized when, in fact, they have not" (Mc-
Nally, 2003, p. 274). 
My efforts to write about the power of suggestion to 
create false memories have been with the hope of encour-
aging changes in procedures and practices (Loftus, 2002, 
2003; Loftus & Ketcham, 1991, 1994). Aggressive efforts 
to unearth presumably recalcitrant trauma memories can 
lead to false-memory reports. Uncritical acceptance of ev-
ery trauma memory report can harm the false victims and, 
also sadly, trivialize the experiences of the true victims. 
Outside the world of litigation or psychotherapy, the 
findings about memory distortion have implications for 
ordinary life. Take the reading of autobiographies and 
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memoirs. The pioneering physicist Edward Teller recently 
wrote one (Teller, 2001) and was resoundingly criticized 
for his "notorious" selective memory, and specifically for 
"vividly remembering events that never happened." A more 
charitable analysis of Teller's work might involve appreci-
ating it not as a deliberately self-serving untruthful chroni-
cle but for its possible insights into normal memory-distor-
tion processes. Untruths are not necessarily lies. As for the 
"memoir" of Binjamin Wilkomirski in Fragments—the 
false account of a small child's ordeal in the Holocaust— 
was it a deliberate lie, or did he somehow come to con-
vince himself it was true? (See Eskin, 2002.) A different 
area of psychological science is needed to distinguish the 
deliberate lie from the "honest" lie. But sometimes what 
starts as a deliberate lie becomes the person's "truth." The 
story creates a memory rather than the other way around. 
It has been said that we are sum of our memories, that 
all that we have ever experienced goes into that end prod-
uct. But after three decades of my research on memory in 
general and memory distortion in particular, it makes sense 
to consider the reverse of this statement. People's memo-
ries are not only the sum of all that they have done, but 
there is more to them: The memories are also the sum of 
what they have thought, what they have been told, what 
they believe. Who we are may be shaped by our memories, 
but our memories are shaped by who we are and what we 
have been led to believe. Or as the psychiatrist Sally Satel 
(2003) said, "We are always angling the prism of memory" 
(p. 31). We seem to reinvent our memories, and in doing 
so, we become the person of our own imagination. 
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